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Abstract
We develop and estimate a structural model that explicitly characterises the
dynamic nature of the interactions, feedbacks and spillovers between macro-
prudential policy, and the banking and real estate sectors. Using Irish data
we find that borrower-based macroprudential instruments such as LTI and
LTV ratios significantly affect credit demand, while intermediary-based in-
struments such as LTD and capital ratios are important determinants of
credit supply. We simulate two counterfactual scenarios to demonstrate
the model’s usefulness for policy analysis. We show that the boom-bust dy-
namics in Irish credit growth and property prices could have been signif-
icantly dampened if a macroprudential regime that managed credit condi-
tions through a credit-based LTV rule had been in operation. Finally, notwith-
standing its enhancement of banks’ balance sheet resilience, we show that
the implementation of a countercyclical capital buffer would have had a rel-
atively weak impact on real and financial volatility.
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11. Introduction
The recent financial crisis highlighted the necessity of developing models of fi-
nancial intermediation that can capture the importance of financial sector shocks
to the real economy (Blanchard et al, 2010; Linde et al, 2016). Although research
on the role of financial factors in investment and consumption dynamics had
a rich history prior to 2007, the scale of the disruption generated by distortions
that had manifested in the pre-crisis expansion and that were amplified by the
downturn, has given new impetus to the formal modelling of macro-financial
linkages. In particular, recent models have focused on the nature of credit sup-
ply disruptions, especially those arising through the capital channel, and have
integrated new policy instruments that specifically target the maintenance of fi-
nancial stability (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Benes et al, 2014).
A modelling framework that can elucidate or quantify the nature of the inter-
action between the banking system and the real economy and that can demon-
strate the potential effectiveness of macroprudential policy is particularly appo-
site in the case of Ireland. From 2003 to 2008 the balance sheet of the domestically-
relevant Irish banking sector tripled in size driven mainly by lending to Irish
households and non-financial corporations, and enabled by significant struc-
tural change in the funding environment facing banks over the period.1
Non-intrusive financial regulation and the absence of a macroprudential pol-
icy regime in particular, created distortions that allowed banks to relax non-
1This structural change was primarily reflected in the large increase in the share of non-
domestic funding in the pre-crisis period as Irish banks became increasingly reliant on wholesale
rather than retail funding to finance the growth in lending. Irish banks also engaged in extensive
mortgage securitisation during the period through the issuance of covered bonds. These new
sources of funding drained rapidly from the banking system with the onset of the financial crisis
which initiated the process of balance sheet deleveraging (Coates and Everett, 2013).
2interest credit conditions through variations in loan maturities, loan-to-income
(LTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios (Honohan, 2010; McCarthy and McQuinn,
2017).2 The resulting shift in the relation between the volume of credit on one
side, and income levels and asset values on the other, led to banks, firms and
households becoming highly leveraged.3
By 2015, however, the total assets of this sector had fallen to approximately
half of its 2008 level. The most calamitous effects originated from banks’ large
exposures to commercial real estate (CRE).4 Irish banks faced an average write-
down on these loans of 58 percent when they were transferred to the asset man-
agement agency, or “bad bank”, established by the Irish government prior to be-
ing recapitalised, with losses on these loans accounting for approximately half
of the recapitalisation requirements (ESRB,2015).
Ireland provides the prototypical example of how this leverage cycle ampli-
fies cycles in the real economy. In the decade prior to onset of the financial cri-
sis, Ireland experienced the largest increase in real house prices across all OECD
economies with an average annual appreciation rate of over ten percent (Duffy
et al, 2016). The strong concordance between the residential and commercial
property sectors was reflected in a similar rate of growth in real commercial cap-
ital values. The rising returns to real estate investment generated a construction
2The distortions which lead to excessive leverage may be driven by externalities in the finan-
cial system. First, each individual bank may not consider that their portfolio or lending decisions
may increase the likelihood of asset sales by all banks in the future which may depress collateral
values and ultimately restrict lending through the banking system. Second, strategic comple-
mentarities may generate incentives to imitate the lending behaviour of other more profitable
banks due, for example, to reputational concerns (Giese et al, 2013).
3Gerlach-Kristen and McInerney (2014) find that the relation between mortgage credit and
house prices had become statistically explosive by mid-2003.
4The real estate sector has also been a primary source of financial distress in other crises such
as the Savings and Loans crisis in the US in the late 1980s and the Scandanavian crisis of the early
1990s (Davis and Zhu,2011).
3boom that expanded the total stock of dwellings by almost 50 percent during
this period. However, the financial crisis precipitated a collapse in Irish prop-
erty prices that was the largest across all advanced countries with house prices
falling by a half relative to the pre-crisis peak and a peak-to-trough decline in
commercial property prices of over 60 percent. Construction activity effectively
came to a halt. The ensuing recession and rise in the unemployment rate led to
a spike in corporate insolvencies, and a steep and protracted increase in house-
hold mortgage arrears, which still remain elevated.
In this paper, we present an empirical framework within which the bidirec-
tional linkages between the banking and real estate sectors are formalised and
their relative strength quantified. In particular, we develop a structural model
that explicitly characterises the dynamic nature of the interactions, feedbacks
and spillovers between macroprudential policy, bank’s lending behaviour, house-
hold and corporate borrowing, and fluctuations in property prices. Although the
model is estimated using Irish data, the underlying specification is sufficiently
general that it can be easily estimated using a similar dataset for other coun-
tries. Importantly, our sample covers a period of significant real and financial
volatility in the Irish economy. While this poses its own econometric challenges,
it allows us to capture more completely how distortions for example originate
and propagate, particularly in terms of generating potential accelerator effects.5
There are relatively few studies that examine the behaviour of the banking
sector and credit markets from a structural econometric perspective. At their
5A common criticism of structural econometric models is that the parameters are not truly
“structural” as they are not invariant to changes in policy (the Lucas critique). Our model is
estimated over a sample period that includes phases of quite differing volatilities and rates of
structural change in the banking and real estate sectors. However, by specifying equations that
incorporate these characteristics so that the estimated parameters are stable over time, we argue
that our results are considerably insulated from this critique.
4core, these models comprise demand and supply equations for different types
of credit. Here, our model is similar to those of Liadze and Davis (2012) and No-
bili and Zollino (2012) in that, in order to isolate supply from demand factors, we
must use the identifying assumption that loan quantities do not enter the sup-
ply equations. This is consistent with our theoretical framework in which banks
are monopolistically competitive due, for example, to switching and monitoring
costs as well as informational asymmetries that generate market power (Freixas
and Rochet, 2008). This assumption implies that banks set the price of lending
(the interest rate) as a markup over the cost of funding and also that banks can
accommodate any level of credit demand at this interest rate.6
Importantly from a financial stability perspective, our model shows that usual
indicators of distress in the household and corporate sectors such as mortgage
arrears and insolvency rates have important financial triggers, which then feed-
back into banks’ loan-pricing decisions through this markup. This mechanism
can generate accelerator effects similar to those in, for example, Bernanke et al
(1996).
The primary contribution of our model is to incorporate several macropru-
dential instruments into a model of the banking and real estate sectors. One
of the key drivers behind the renewed focus on integrating the financial sector
into macroeconomic models is the increasing emphasis placed by policymakers
on macroprudential tools that aim to mitigate systemic risk by dampening the
source and propogation of financial volatility. However, the channels through
which these tools affect the behaviour of banks, households and firms are still
6This suggests that the supply curve for each type of credit is perfectly elastic. See Gerlach-
Kristen and McInerney (2014) for an alternative framework in which the price of credit rises with
the quantity of credit supplied due, for example, to implicit constraints on leverage.
5uncertain (Galati and Moessner, 2017). We outline a unifying empirical frame-
work within which the transmission, interaction and spillover mechanisms of
several macroprudential instruments can be explicitly and jointly specified and
quantified.
As far as we are aware, we are the first to introduce borrower- and liquid-
ity based instruments, in addition to capital ratios, into a structural economet-
ric model. In this respect, our model contributes to the literature on the ef-
fectiveness of macroprudential instruments.7 In the case of those that target
credit demand, several studies have used reduced-form single-equations (Duca
et al, 2011), vector autoregressions (Kuttner and Shim, 2013), and panel meth-
ods (IMF, 2011) to examine how these instruments affect rates of credit growth
and house price appreciation. However, these studies do not explicitly spec-
ify how changes in the LTV and LTI ratios are transmitted through the banking
sector or real economy. Moreover, they do not allow these effects to feedback
into banks’ balance sheets, to interact with intermediary-based instruments and
consequently, to affect banks’ lending behaviour.8
We also show how instruments that affect the liability structure of this sector
such as the loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratio and the capital ratio affect banks’ lend-
ing behaviour. The financial crisis starkly illustrated how liquidity mismatch be-
tween assets and liabilities can increase the vulnerability of the sector to a sys-
7A recent exception is Davis et al (2018) who incorporate the LTV ratio into the necessarily
parsimonious house price equations of several countries in the NiGEM global macroeconomet-
ric model. However, this specification is not “structural” in the sense that it does not explicitly
capture the direct impact of collateral (or downpayment) constraints on new mortgage lending,
which is the role of this type of borrower-based macroprudential instrument.
8Duffy et al (2016) estimate an econometric model of the Irish mortgage and housing markets
in which LTV and LTI ratios affect the demand for new mortgage lending. However, they do not
consider feedbacks to banks’ balance sheets, spillovers to other property markets, or interactions
with other macroprudential instruments.
6temic bank run (Uhlig, 2010; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2015). Basel III has sought
to address these liquidity issues with the introduction of the Liquidity Coverage
Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio. In the Irish case, the central bank in
2011 introduced constraints on banks’ ability to fund balance sheet expansion
through short-term wholesale funding by imposing restrictions on the LTD ra-
tio. As deposit funding is less subject to roll-over risk and less “flighty” relative
to short-term debt or money market funding (Shin and Shin, 2011), the higher
the share of lending that is financed by deposits the lower should be the asso-
ciated exposure of banks to systemic liquidity risk. In our model, the LTD ratio
acts as a macroprudential instrument that reflects the cost of mitigating liquidity
risk. In contrast to the borrower-based instruments that target credit demand,
restrictions on the LTD ratio affect banks directly by raising the marginal cost of
funding and thus shifting the credit supply schedule.
In addition to funding risk, the financial crisis also highlighted the impor-
tance of bank capital in the transmission of real and financial shocks (Jermann
and Quadrini, 2012). In response to this, central banks and prudential authori-
ties through the Basel III accord have raised required levels of capital adequacy
significantly in an effort to manage systemic risk. One of the key components of
this new regulatory architecture is the introduction of a counter-cyclical capital
buffer (CCyB) that is activated during periods of high credit growth.
However, although higher levels of capital can enhance financial stability,
they may also be associated with higher economic costs. One important feature
of our modelling framework is that it allows us to quantify these costs in terms of
the price and volume of different types of credit. Accordingly, we also contribute
to the literature on the impact of changes in capital requirements on banks’ lend-
7ing and pricing behaviour.9 In contrast to many of these studies which exam-
ine the impact of higher capital ratios on a representative lending rate and total
credit growth, we decompose this impact for each lending rate and ultimately,
for each credit stock.10 In this respect, we identify the margins along which the
Irish banking sector adjusts to higher capital requirements. This also allows us
to simulate the impact of macroprudential policy by raising the capital ratio in
accordance with the CCyB.
We demonstrate the usefulness of the model for macroprudential policy anal-
ysis by simulating the model under two counterfactual scenarios. As Ireland
provides an exemplar of a quintessential credit-fuelled property market boom
and bust, an interesting question is what would the path of the banking and
real estate sectors have been if a macroprudential regime had been in opera-
tion during this period. We construct “alternative histories” by imposing certain
assumptions about the reaction function of the macroprudential authority. This
allows us to compare the effectiveness of different macroprudential instruments
in maintaining financial stability.
First, we examine how credit and real estate markets would have evolved un-
der different countercyclical rules for the LTV ratio and find that a rule that tar-
geted credit growth would have achieved the greatest degree of macrofinancial
stabilisation. We then consider how the introduction of the CCyB would have af-
fected banks’ behaviour and ultimately, the volatility of real estate markets. Our
results suggest that the real impact of instruments that work through the inter-
mediary are relatively small when compared to that of instruments that directly
9See Dagher et al (2016) for an overview of this literature.
10The structural models of Liadze and Davis (2012) and Nobili and Zollino (2012) also allow
capital ratios to have a differential impact on each lending rate.
8affect credit demand.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines our
model of the Irish banking and real estate sectors. Section 3 presents and dis-
cusses the econometric results. Section 4 outlines several counterfactual sce-
narios to illustrate the model’s usefulness for macroprudential policy analysis.
Section 5 concludes.
2. AModel of the Irish Banking Sector
2.1. Mortgage Credit
One of the primary contributions of this paper is the formal modelling of the
interaction between the property market and borrower-based macroprudential
instruments such as the LTI and LTV ratios. These ratios are increasingly being
viewed as an important tool in the management of financial stability (Claessens,
2015). However, there is a critical absence of a structural econometric framework
within which the transmission of these instruments to the banking sector and
real economy, and the dynamic responses of banks, households and firms can
be analysed or quantified.
In the Irish case, higher LTI and LTV ratios in the pre-crisis period relaxed
affordability and collateral constraints which lead to a surge in mortgage lend-
ing (McCarthy and McQuinn, 2017). This relaxation in credit conditions meant
that the relation between house prices and mortgage credit became statistically
explosive from 2003 onwards (Gerlach-Kristen and McInerney, 2014). Under-
standing how variations in these ratios affect housing supply and demand and
their concomitant impact on banks’ behaviour is crucial to understanding how
9the Irish property bubble and crash developed. It also allows macroprudential
policymakers to draw important lessons from the Irish experience.
The recent empirical literature on the impact of borrower-based macropru-
dential instruments on the aggregate housing market has tended to be either
reduced-form or single-equation panel data studies. These reduced-form spec-
ifications typically include the LTV ratio or time dummies as indicators of credit
conditions in a traditional house price equation (Fernandez-Corugedo and Muell-
bauer, 2006; Duca et al). The panel data studies tend to examine the impact of
various macroprudential instruments such as the LTI, LTV and debt-service-to-
income (DSTI) ratios on credit or house price growth in a single-equation setting
that does not allow interaction between, or feedbacks from, housing and credit
markets (IMF, 2011; Kuttner and Shim, 2016).
In order to understand the dynamic impact of these macroprudential instru-
ments on the real economy and the corresponding feedback to balance sheets
and bank behaviour, policymakers require a structural model which specifies
and quantifies each transmission and feedback channel. There are few studies
that try to isolate demand from supply factors in relation to the (aggregate) vol-
ume of credit extended. Some of these, such as Nobili and Zollino (2012), Liadze
and Davis (2012), and Gerlach-Kristen and McInerney (2014) estimate structural
models of the mortgage and housing markets, but these studies do not incorpo-
rate the impact of credit conditions or macroprudential policy. Others such as
Avouyi-Dovi et al (2014) use a relatively parsimonious model to analyse the im-
pact of changes in lending criteria, as captured by the debt service to income
ratio, on credit demand and the housing market.
The borrower-based instruments we focus on in this paper are, along with
the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), the key components of the macropru-
10
dential policy framework in Ireland. In 2015, the Central Bank of Ireland in its
capacity as the domestic macroprudential authority introduced caps on the LTI
and LTV ratios on mortgage lending to first time buyers.11 As these borrower-
based instruments affect new mortgage lending rather than the stock of existing
lending, we focus on estimating a behavioural equation for mortgage demand in
terms of the former rather than the latter.12
In our framework the demand for new mortgage lending is modelled as a
function of real personal disposable income, the real mortgage interest rate and
real house prices.13
In addition to these conventional drivers of mortgage demand, we seek to
elucidate and quantify the channels through which fluctuations in mortgage
credit conditions affect borrower behaviour. It is through its impact on the lat-
ter that macroprudential policy can be used to directly stabilise credit growth.
Credit conditions act as an accelerator in that they amplify the impact of income
and collateral effects on house prices (Almeida, Campello and Lu, 2006).14
11The LTI cap was set at 3.5, while the LTV ceiling was set at 90 percent of the value of the house
up to 220,000 euro and 80 percent thereafter. Banks were also allowed to exempt 20 percent of
all new mortgage lending from the LTI limits and 15 percent from the LTV limit. See CBI (2015)
for details.
12Duffy et al (2016) estimate a similar equation for mortgage demand using different data.
13The few existing structural models of mortgage credit relate the mortgage stock to affordabil-
ity in terms of income and interest rates and to collateral, as indicated by house prices (Nobili
and Zollino, 2012; Liadze and Davis, 2012; Gerlach-Kristen and McInerney, 2014; and Duffy et al,
2016). This is analagous to DSGE models of mortgage credit, in which affordability depends on
the (lifetime) budget constraint that incorporates future income and interest rates and in which
collateral depends on house prices (Iacoviello, 2005). In addition, our model of mortgage de-
mand allows affordability and collateral constraints to be relaxed via changes in the LTI and LTV
ratios, respectively. This is similar to recent DSGE models which treat the LTV ratio as an exoge-
nous collateral constraint that is used to reflect lending conditions (Iacoviello and Neri (2010),
Gerali et al (2010); Benes and Kumhof, 2015)
14For example, IMF (2011) finds empirical evidence that high LTV ratios strengthen the impact
of real GDP growth on house price growth, with a coefficient that is half of the direct effect of real
GDP growth.
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Our measures of the LTV and LTI ratios are constructed using aggregate data
on new mortgage approvals. Using these “raw” ratios as indicators of credit con-
ditions in a mortgage equation would clearly be endogenous as they depend
on several factors such as interest rates, income and house prices (Fernandez-
Corugedo and Muellbauer, 2006). We address potential endogeneity concerns in
using these constructed variables to reflect exogenous changes in credit condi-
tions (or collateral and affordability constraints) by isolating variations in the LTI
and LTV ratios that are orthogonal to changing expectations about house prices,
income, interest rates and the unemployment rate (Cameron et al, 2006; Duca et
al, 2011).15 The resulting ratios represent shifts in the quantity of credit available
at each income and house price level and so are ideal instruments for gauging
the impact of macroprudential policy that imposes restrictions on these ratios.
The demand for new mortgage lending therefore has the following form:
NewMortgagest = α + β1NewMortgagest−1 + β2RMorRatet + β3LTVt
+ β4LTIt + β5∆HPt−1 + β6∆Incomet−1 + εt (1)
where NewMortgages is the volume of real new mortgage lending, RMorRate is
the real mortgage interest rate, Income is real personal disposable income, HP
is the real house price, and LTV and LTI are the respective ratios adjusted for
cyclical factors. The lagged dependent variable is included to capture persis-
tence in new mortgage lending. ε is the error term. All variables, except for the
mortgage interest rate, are in logs. We use the changes in income and house
prices rather than their levels given the differences in the order of integration
among the regressors. Nominal variables are deflated by the consumer expen-
15See Duffy et al (2016) for more details on this procedure.
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diture deflator to obtain real values. We assume that inflation expectations are
extrapolative and therefore that real interest rates are calculated as the current
nominal rate minus the annualised lagged quarterly change in the consumer ex-
penditure deflator.16
Although macroprudential policy affects the volume of new mortgage lend-
ing, it is the total outstanding stock of mortgage credit which affects households’
and banks’ balance sheets. We allow the volume of new mortgage lending to ac-
cumulate on the previous period’s capital stock similar to the perpetual inven-
tory method used to characterise the evolution of the housing stock below:17
MorStockt = β1MorStockt−1 +NewMortgagest + εt (2)
where MorStock is the (notional) mortgage stock in real terms and εt is the error
term. β1 indicates the rate of net mortgage repayment and is analagous to the
depreciation rate in the housing stock equation. It is important to emphasise
that we use notional stocks based on transactions data rather than balance sheet
stocks to model demand for each credit aggregate as the former incorporates the
impact of securitisation, valuation effects, asset disposals and other factors that
drive a wedge between stocks and the accumulation of net flows.18 However,
banks’ lending behaviour and capital position are driven by actual stocks of each
type of lending held on balance sheet. We model these balance sheet stocks as
a simple linear function of their notional counterparts and adjust for statistical
breaks where necessary.19
16Our results are not sensitive to other specifications of expectation formation which incorpo-
rate information from a longer time horizon.
17See also Duffy et al (2016).
18I thank Martin O’Brien for this suggestion.
19These results are available on request. It is worth noting that modelling the drivers of the
13
In terms of mortgage supply, we follow the literature and assume that banks
are monopolistically competitive (Freixas and Rochet, 2008). This implies that
banks set interest rates as a markup over funding costs. The assumption that
the quantity of credit does not enter the supply equation is necessary for the
separate identification of supply and demand factors (Davis and Liadze, 2012;
Nobili and Zollino, 2012).
Funding costs are represented by the deposit rate and the money market rate.
The latter is approximated by 3-month Euribor and is the main channel through
which monetary policy affects interest rates.20 The markup set by banks over
these marginal funding costs is time-varying and dependent on macroeconomic
and sector-specific risk, internal capital management, and the liquidity compo-
sition of liabilities.
As the majority of Irish banks’ assets have historically been in the form of
loans, risk in the model primarily reflects credit risk which is driven by factors
that affect borrowers’ debt-servicing capacity and collateral values. The riski-
ness of lending to the household sector therefore reflects the implied loss given
default as well as the repayment capacity of households. The former can be cap-
tured by the undrawn equity of households given by the residual proportion of
housing wealth net of mortgage debt, while we use the unemployment rate to
capture the latter.21
As discussed below in relation to our model of bank capital, we assume that
the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold, so that banks find it relatively costly
wedge between notional and actual stocks is not possible given data availability.
20See ECB (2009) for evidence that Irish banks used three-month Euribor as the base rate off
which the standard variable mortgage rate was priced.
21Both housing equity and the unemployment rate have been shown to be significant predic-
tors of household mortgage arrears. See the model of mortgage arrears below for further discus-
sion.
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to raise capital.22 Consistent with the empirical evidence on the behaviour of
banks since the crisis, the main channel through which banks raise capital in the
model is through higher retained earnings (Cohen and Scatigna, 2016). Banks
achieve this through higher lending rates, which subsequently lead, depending
on the elasticity of demand for each type of credit, to a decline in lending and to
a fall in risk-weighted assets.23
Finally, we also allow macroprudential policy to enter the supply of credit
through the constraints on the composition of funding via the LTD ratio. Vari-
ation in the share of wholesale funding was a significant driver of changes in
the supply of credit in the Irish case (Addison-Smyth et al, 2009; Coates and Ev-
erett, 2013). Deposits tend to be one of the least “flighty” sources of funding
and are generally subject to much lower rollover risk than wholesale funding.
Indeed, rising LTD ratios are one of the most robust early warning indicators
of impending financial distress (Shin and Shin, 2011). The Basel III regulatory
framework aims to reduce the vulnerability of the banking system to liquidity
shortages by implementing targets for the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).24 In the case of Ireland, the post-crisis regula-
tory focus in terms of liquidity requirements has been on the LTD ratio.25
22In other words, we assume that the Modigliani-Miller offset is incomplete so that the cost
of raising finance through equity rather than debt exceeds the reduction in the cost of capital
arising from the increase in the share of liabilities that comprise equity capital. Empirically, the
offset if found to be small. For example, Gambacorta and Shin (2016), using a sample of interna-
tional banks over the period 1994-2012, show that a one percentage point increase in the ratio of
equity to total assets reduces average (debt) funding costs by 4 basis points.
23Risk-weighted assets are constructed using risk-weights for each type of lending under the
Basel I accord as this was the regulatory regime that was in place for most of our sample period.
24The LCR is the ratio of high quality liquid assets to net cash outflows over the next 30 days.
The NSFR measures the amount of stable funding relative to the required amount where the
former is defined as the portion of capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over a particular
horizon. See BCBS (2010) for details.
25The Financial Measures Programme (CBI, 2011) introduced by the Central Bank of Ireland in
15
Accordingly, we estimate the supply of mortgage lending within an error-
correction framework with the nominal mortgage rate adjusting over time to the
following long-run relation:
MorRatet = α + β1MMRatet + β2DepRatet + β3HHEquityt
+ β4URatet + β5CAPt + β6LTDt + εt (3)
where MorRate is the nominal mortgage rate, MMRate is the money market
rate,DepRate is the deposit rate,HHEquity is the residual proportion of housing
wealth net of mortgage debt, URate is the unemployment rate, CAP is the ratio
of capital to risk-weighted assets, LTD is the LTD ratio and ε is the stationary
equilibrium error. In the short run, we allow persistence in the mortgage rate to
be driven by contemporaneous and lagged changes in the variables in (3).
2.2. Consumer Credit
There is a vast literature investigating the effects of housing and financial wealth
on consumption, with the general consensus that these effects tend to increase
the lower are credit and liquidity constraints (Muellbauer, 2007; Carroll et al,
2011). We follow this literature and assume that the drivers of consumption and
the demand for consumer credit are similar. Accordingly, we assume that the
stock of consumer credit is a function of disposable income, interest rates and
wealth effects, with the latter conditional on the net position of households in
relation to both housing and financial investments.
Housing equity can affect consumer credit demand through the “housing
2011 set an upper limit on the LTD ratio of 1.22 and banks have subsequently been encouraged
to reduce the ratio further. The LTD ratio had fallen to 0.8 by 2015Q4.
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wealth effect”. Abstracting from credit constraints, a perceived permanent in-
crease in the net housing wealth of home owners may generate an increase in
demand for credit to finance non-housing related consumption. This balance
sheet channel may be important from a credit worthiness perspective depend-
ing on the extent to which households can leverage their net worth (Nobili and
Zollino, 2012). In addition, financial deregulation and greater competition in the
Irish banking sector enabled households to obtain loans backed by housing eq-
uity (Lydon and O’Hanlon, 2012; Lydon and O’Leary, 2013). Higher house prices
allow households to increase debt or refinance existing debt at lower interest
rates. The availability of home equity loans increases the “spendability” of hous-
ing wealth and can magnify the strength of the housing wealth effect (Muell-
bauer, 2007).
The literature on wealth effects and consumption also finds evidence that
the latter responds to changes in net financial wealth, although the size of the
impact varies considerably across countries (Case et al, 2005; Barrell et al, 2015).
However, the direction of the effect of higher net financial wealth on the demand
for consumer credit is an empirical question and likely depends on the liquid-
ity of financial assets. For example, if financial wealth mainly comprises rela-
tively liquid instruments such as stocks and bonds, then if net financial wealth
increases, households may choose to divest financial assets to finance consump-
tion rather than obtain bank credit. However, if financial wealth is mainly in the
form of technical reserves or pensions, then households may instead finance
consumption using bank loans. We model the demand for consumer credit in
an error-correction framework that allows adjustment to the following long-run
17
relation:
ConsCreditt = α + β1RConsRatet + β2Incomet + β3HHEquityt
+ β4NFWt + εt (4)
where ConsCreditt is the (notional) stock of consumer loans in real terms,
RConsRatet is the real interest rate on consumer loans, NFWt is real net finan-
cial wealth and ε is the equilibrium error.
As with the mortgage rate, the supply of consumer loans is represented by
the interest rate on consumer lending. Similar to the mortgage rate, the latter is
modelled as a variable mark-up over deposit and money market funding costs,
while the mark-up itself is a function of risk, liquidity and banks’ internal capital
management.
We relate the risk associated with this type of unsecured lending to both macroe-
conomic and sector-specific factors. We allow the unemployment rate to cap-
ture the former and the ratio of consumer credit to income to capture the latter.
These variables reflect the debt-servicing capacity and income gearing of house-
holds with respect to consumer credit.26
The consumer lending rate also depends on the structure of banks’ balance
sheets in terms of the composition of liabilities. Both the capital and LTD ratios
have a qualitatively similar impact on the consumer lending rate to that on the
26As this type of lending is unsecured we also considered a number of risk factors that might
distinguish this type of lending from mortgage credit such as income and interest rate expec-
tations, stock market volatility as an approximate measure of economic uncertainty, and the
spread between three-month Euribor and the three-month yield on treasury bills. These vari-
ables however were statistically insignificant. In addition, we considered whether banks incor-
porate the total income gearing of households by including secured and unsecured household
lending. This variable was also insignificant.
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mortgage rate. However, an important contribution of our analysis is to show
how these impacts differ quantitatively for unsecured relative to secured house-
hold lending and household relative to corporate lending. We therefore allow the
nominal consumer interest rate, ConsRate, to adjust over time to the following
long-run relation:
ConsRatet = α + β1MMRatet + β2DepRatet + β3URatet
+ β4(ConsCreditt/Incomet) + β5CAPt + β6LTDt + εt (5)
where ε is the stationary equilibrium error. In addition to error-correction, short-
run dynamics in the consumer rate depend on lagged and contemporaneous
changes in the variables in 5.
2.3. Corporate Credit
2.3.1. Demand for Corporate Credit
Bank-intermediated credit is the primary source of external financing for Irish
non-financial firms, which are almost entirely small and medium enterprises
(Lawless et al, 2013). However, treating corporate credit as a homogenous cat-
egory would ignore significant heterogeneity across different types of corporate
lending in terms of their impact on the economy and on financial stability.
In particular, the spike in corporate insolvencies and collapse of Irish com-
mercial property prices in the aftermath of the financial crisis was on such a
scale that government intervention was necessary to prevent several banks from
failing due to losses on CRE lending.27 This type of lending tends to be signif-
27See Schoenmaker (2015) for an overview.
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icantly more cyclical and volatile than other components of banks’ loan port-
folios (ESRB, 2015). In addition, default rates on these loans tend to be higher
than on residential mortgages as the former are often limited-recourse and com-
mercial premises fulfil a purely economic purpose rather than a social purpose
as in the case of housing.28 Given the importance of CRE lending from a finan-
cial stability perspective, we therefore distinguish this type of lending from other
corporate credit.
The stock of CRE loans includes lending to firms engaged in the construc-
tion of both residential housing and commercial real estate. Although this type
of lending is typically staggered with different stages of development, we assume
that that real housing wealth (or alternatively the real value of the housing stock)
can be used as an approximation for the collateral against lending for housing
construction, while the real value of commercial property can be used to approx-
imate the collateral used to construct and invest in commercial real estate. The
value of commercial property can influence the availability of credit through im-
proving a firm’s net worth, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), or raising the value
of the collateral that firms provide against bank loans, as in Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997).29
Analagous to the models of household credit demand outlined above, the de-
mand for CRE loans is also a function of activity levels and the cost of credit. We
approximate the derived demand for this type of credit from higher levels of em-
ployment and investment using real GDP, which captures the cyclical volatility
that has characterised this lending historically.
28As ESRB (2015) notes, in contrast to commercial real estate, housing is both an investment
and consumption good as households purchase residential real estate to live in.
29See Gan (2007) and Chaney et al (2012) for evidence of a positive relation between collateral
values and the volume of credit and investment.
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In terms of the cost of bank financing, individual interest rates on different
types of corporate credit are unfortunately not available. Instead, we use the rep-
resentative interest rate on corporate lending to approximate the cost of credit to
the CRE sector.30 The demand for CRE credit is modelled in an error-correction
framework with the following long-run equilibrium:
CREt = α1 + β1RCorpRatet + β2RGDPt + β3ComPropt
+ β4HWealtht + εt (6)
whereCRE is the (notional) stock of real commercial real estate loans,RCorpRatet
is the real interest rate on corporate lending,RGDP is real GDP,ComPropt is the
private capital stock revalued in terms of commercial property capital values,
HWealth is real housing wealth (or the value of the housing stock), and εt is a
stationary error term.
The demand for non-property corporate credit follows a similar functional
form to that specified for CRE credit in (6). In particular, a common factor driv-
ing both types of corporate lending is commercial property as the primary collat-
eral against which credit can be secured. Therefore, the Kiyotaki-Moore (1997)
channel may be important for both types of credit. To reflect this credit rationing
and given the difficulties of measuring the net worth of firms at the aggregate
level, we again use the the private capital stock revalued in terms of commercial
property capital values as an approximate indicator.
As mentioned, Irish firms are mainly small and medium enterprises and thus
are likely subject to an external financing premium on bank-intermediated bor-
30We note that it is likely given the historical volatility of this sector that the interest rate on
CRE lending carries a risk premium over other types of corporate lending.
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rowing (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Holton and McCann, 2016). For these firms,
it is relatively cheaper to first use retained earnings to finance investment be-
fore turning to external sources of funding. Accordingly, the demand for bank
credit should, all else equal, be negatively related to the level of retained earn-
ings. Given data availability, we use the aggregate level of after-tax profits to
approximate the latter.
Finally, we also relate the demand for non-property corporate loans to the
level of economic activity and the cost of credit. As in (6), we use the real GDP
to capture the derived demand for credit from higher levels of investment and
from working capital requirements. However, in contrast to the strong cyclical
volatility of property-related corporate lending, other types of corporate lending
has tended to grow more in line with GDP. 31 As discussed above, the data do not
allow us to distinguish between the costs of different types of corporate lending
and therefore we use the representative interest rate on all corporate lending as
an approximation for the cost of non-property corporate credit.
The stock of other (non-property) corporate loans therefore adjusts over time
to the following long-run relation:
OCorpt = α + β1RCorpRatet + β2RGDPt + β3ComPropt
+ β4Profitst + εt (7)
whereOCorp is the (notional) real stock of non-property corporate lending,Profits
are the real after-tax profits of non-financial corporations, and εt is the equilib-
rium error term. In addition to error-correction, the short-run dynamics of non-
31The share of non-property corporate lending in GDP has been relatively constant over the
last three decades.
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property corporate lending are driven by lagged and contemporaneous changes
in the variables in (7).
2.3.2. Supply of Corporate Credit
The supply of corporate credit is represented by the interest rate on loans to non-
financial corporations. To preserve consistency with our models of the supply
of mortgage and consumer credit, the corporate rate is specified as a markup
over funding costs, with the markup itself determined by the risk associated with
corporate lending and the structure of banks’ balance sheets.
Importantly, we use the risk component of the markup to establish links be-
tween the cost of credit and the balance sheets of non-financial corporations
in a mechanism similar to that outlined in Bernanke and Gertler (1989). These
links are both direct and indirect. First, we use the corporate gearing ratio as in-
dicated by the share of total corporate credit in GDP to reflect the debt burden
of non-financial firms and thus the capacity of these firms to service their debt.
Second, we include the corporate insolvency rate to capture general repayment
risk associated with lending to firms. However, a key driver of the insolvency rate
is the value of commercial property, which we use to approximate the strength
of firms’ balance sheets. We therefore incorporate an indirect channel between
the latter and the interest rate on corporate lending.
The remaining components of the markup reflect banks’capital and liquidity
management. The sensitivity of the corporate lending rate to changes in the cap-
ital ratio is important in determining how significant this margin of adjustment
is to banks in meeting particular targets for macroprudential capital buffers.
Similarly, liquidity constraints through restrictions on the LTD ratio lead to
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banks using proportionately more relatively expensive deposit funding at the
margin. As with the capital ratio, the difference in the elasticity of each of the
lending rates with respect to changes in the LTD ratio is an important determi-
nant of how banks may adjust to the changes in the composition of funding re-
quired under the Basel III framework. The equation for the corporate rate there-
fore has the following long-run form:
CorpRatet = α + β1MMRatet + β2DepRatet + β3Insolvt
+ β4(CorpCreditt/GDPt) + β5CAPt + β6LTDt + εt (8)
where CorpRate in the nominal interest rate on corporate lending, Insolv is the
corporate insolvency rate, CorpCredit is total lending to non-financial corpora-
tions, GDP is nominal GDP and ε is the stationary equilibrium error. The error-
correction model allows adjustment to this long-run relation and short-run dy-
namics from contemporaneous and lagged changes in the variables in (8).
2.4. Housing
As previously discussed, the residential housing market has propagated signif-
icant macroeconomic and financial volatility in the case of Ireland. As hous-
ing is the primary asset of Irish households (Lawless et al, 2015), fluctuations in
house prices have a significant impact on both households’ and, through mort-
gage lending, on banks’ balance sheets.
In traditional housing models, the housing demand function is inverted so
that (real) house prices are a function of the demand for housing services with
the latter typically approximated by the per-capita housing stock. Variables that
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shift the demand schedule for housing include household income, rental yields
and demographic factors. In equilibrium, the user cost of housing capital in
terms of house prices will equal the rental yield.
However, the ability of these models to explain the behaviour of house prices
across countries declined during the period of rapid appreciation that began in
the early 2000s and continued up to the onset of the financial crisis (Muellbauer,
2012). One factor driving the poor empirical performance of traditional house
price equations was the omission of variables that could account for the impact
of changing credit conditions (Duffy et al, 2016).
In this context, recent house price models have sought to complement the
user cost measure with an indicator that reflects shifts in the supply of credit.
For example, Duca et al (2011) show that including the median LTV ratio for first-
time buyers in a quite traditional house price model significantly improves its
ability to explain pre-crisis house price dynamics in the US. However, as men-
tioned previously, these studies tend to use either reduced-form single-equation
or VAR models.
One of the central contributions of this paper is to develop a structural frame-
work that elucidates the interactions, feedbacks and spillovers between credit
and housing markets. To this end, equations (1) and (2) show how changes in
credit conditions, as reflected for example in a higher LTV ratio, directly affects
the availability of credit. In a structural model it is the availability of credit rather
than the LTV ratio itself which should enter the house price equation in some
form. However, simply including the stock of mortgages in the latter would not
reflect the extent to which the volume of outstanding credit has deviated from
the level that would be implied for example by income levels. Therefore, the
stock of credit needs to be normalised by a variable so that the resulting ratio
25
can indicate how this “excess” credit stock is changing over time.
Here, we draw an analogy with the credit-to-GDP ratio that is the key indica-
tor of excessive credit growth in the Basel III regulatory framework (BCBS, 2010;
Drehmann and Tsatsaronis, 2014). The counterpart to this ratio at the house-
hold level is the mortgage debt-to-income (DTI) ratio and therefore we use this
variable to link changes in credit availability in the mortgage market to changes
in house prices.32
The second channel through which the mortgage market affects house prices
is the user cost of housing. The latter is constructed as the difference between
the mortgage rate and expected house prices appreciation so that lower interest
rates raise the return on housing investment. We approximate house price ex-
pectations using a moving average of lagged annual house price inflation over
the previous eight quarters.33
Finally, we also relate house prices to the other determinants of house prices
in standard models as represented by disposable income and the demand for
housing services. We use the ratio of the housing stock to the population of 25 to
39 year olds to approximate the latter. This variable incorporates the impact of
demographic factors on house prices. A decline in this ratio implies that the ex-
32The mortgage DTI ratio more accurately reflects a relaxation in borrowing constraints than
a LTV constraint, as income is less subject to distortions from asset bubbles. Gelain et al (2013)
show that LTV ratios in US during the housing boom of the mid-2000s did not indicate a sig-
nificant increase in household leverage as house prices rose with mortgage credit in a self-
reinforcing cycle. The extent of household leverage subsequently became clear when house
prices collapsed. In contrast, the DTI ratio rose rapidly during the boom period and clearly
signalled that household were becoming excessively leveraged. In addition, as the focus here
is on the role mortgage credit availability plays in the determination of house prices, we exclude
consumer credit from this ratio. In any case, the latter comprises a relatively small share of total
household debt. Finally, note that the DTI ratio differs from the LTI ratio in that the former refers
to the outstanding stock of mortgage credit while the latter refers to new mortgage lending.
33Our results are not sensitive to using alternative lag lengths to approximate expectations
formation.
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isting housing stock is becoming scarce relative to desired household formation
and is thereby exerting upward pressure on house prices.
We therefore specify house prices as following an error-correction process
with adjustment to the following long-run equilibrium:
HPt = α + β1User
h
t + β2Incomet + β3(MorStockt/Incomet)
+ β4(HStockt/Pop2539t) + εt (9)
where userh is the real user cost of housing,HStock is the stock of housing units,
Pop2539 is the population of 25 to 39 year olds, and ε is the equilibrium error. In
the short run, we allow house prices to be driven by lagged and contemporane-
ous changes in the variables in (9), as well as by changes in the unemployment
rate.34
On the supply side, we follow Poterba (1984) and Topel and Rosen (1988) and
adopt a Tobin’s Q approach to modelling residential construction. In this frame-
work housing construction is a function of real house prices, construction costs
and credit availability.35 We model the completion of new housing units as a flow
variable that accumulates on the existing housing stock through a perpetual in-
ventory process (Mayer and Sommerville, 2000; Duffy et al, 2016). Our measure
of Tobin’s Q relates the value of housing to its replacement cost. We approximate
this value of Q with the ratio of house prices to building costs, which reflects the
profitability of housing construction (Kenny, 1999). Similar to housing demand,
the housing supply model incorporates two credit channels. We capture the cost
34See Gerlach-Kristen and McInerney (2014) and Kelly and McQuinn (2014) for evidence of the
impact of the unemployment rate on Irish house prices.
35More recent models have also included either farmland or residential land prices. Unfortu-
nately, a representative continuous series for either is not available in the Irish case.
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of credit by the change in the real corporate lending rate and credit availability
by the growth rate of CRE lending. The latter approximates non-interest rate-
related changes in credit conditions for construction firms.
Although these variables do exhibit procyclicality, housing investment itself
is highly correlated with the economic cycle (Davis and Heathcote, 2005; Leamer,
2007). One potential explanation for this residual cyclicality in the housing com-
pletions equation is fluctuations in uncertainty, which tend to be countercycli-
cal (Miles, 2009; Bloom, 2014). Housing construction is subject to uncertainty
due to high fixed costs and concomitant irreversibility of investment. Periods in
which there is higher uncertainty about the future profitability of construction
raises the real option of waiting so that firms may postpone current investment
projects. Accordingly, we include both the output gap and insolvency rate to
capture cyclical variation in uncertainty about the future path of housing de-
mand.36
Finally, we also include an indicator of population trends to reflect any demo-
graphic factors that may affect housing construction. These are captured using
the change in the share of the population of 25 to 39 year olds in the total popu-
lation. Our equation for housing completions therefore has the following form:
HComplt = α + β1HComplt−1 + β2Tobint + β3∆RCorpRatet
+ β4∆CREt−1 + β5GAPt + β6∆GAPt + β7∆(Pop2539t/Popt) + εt (10)
where HCompl is the number of housing units completed in each quarter, Tobin
36The output gap is constructed as the deviation of real GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott filtered
trend. The insolvency rate is included as a second indicator of cyclical variation in aggregate de-
mand due to the difficulty of estimating the potential output of an economy that has experienced
significant real volatility over much of our sample period.
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is Tobin’s Q given by the ratio of house prices to building costs,GAP is the output
gap, Pop is the total population, and ε is a stationary error term. Property-related
corporate lending, the corporate lending rate, the insolvency rate and the pop-
ulation variable are first-differenced to induce stationarity. The first lag of the
dependent variable is included to capture persistence in the construction pro-
cess (Duffy et al, 2016).
As mentioned above, we assume the housing stock (11) follows a perpetual
inventory process with the current level of the housing stock depending on the
depreciated level from the previous period and on new housing completions:
HStockt = δ
hHStockt−1 +HComplt (11)
where δh is the rate of depreciation of the existing housing stock. Following Duffy
et al (2016) we assume that the annual depreciation for dwellings is approxi-
mately 2 percent.
2.5. Commercial Real Estate
As discussed above, the primary channel through which commercial real estate
affects financial stability in our model is through CRE loans. These loans are
mainly secured using commercial property as collateral. It follows that fluctu-
ations in commerical property markets have a potentially important impact on
banks’ balance sheets through losses-given-default on corporate lending. There-
fore, a central contribution of our framework is to outline the transmission and
feedback mechanisms that connect the banking and commercial real estate sec-
tors. Further, equations (6) and (7) show how developments in the commercial
29
property market affect the rest of the corporate sector through its role as col-
lateral. For example, as commercial property rises in value firms may be able
to obtain higher levels of credit through the typical Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
channel.
The literature on the drivers of commercial rents or capital values relates the
return on commercial property investment to the stock of commercial property,
the derived demand for this type of investment, and to the returns on alternative
investments (Ball et al, 2010). Limitations on data availability, particularly in re-
lation to the stock of commercial property, lead to different specifications across
studies. In general however, the derived demand for commercial space is ap-
proximated by real GDP and is expected to be positively related to (real) capital
values.
Our measure of the user cost of commercial property incorporates both an
interest rate and capital gain component. Similar to the house price equation,
the user cost variable represents the primary procyclical channel through which
endogenous cycles in capital values are generated as expectations of apprecia-
tion follow an extrapolative rule. This rule is based on the moving average of
lagged annual changes in capital values over the previous eight quarters.37 We
use the corporate lending rate to reflect the cost of credit used to finance invest-
ment in commercial property.
The previous section outlined how the house price equation needed to be
augmented with a measure of credit availability given that interest rates are a
poor indicator of credit conditions. Analagous to the mortgage credit-to-income
37We are therefore assuming that households and commercial real estate firms use similar
rules to form expectations about the future appreciation of house prices and commercial capital
values.
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ratio for households used above and the private sector credit-to-GDP ratio for
the aggregate economy used in the Basel III framework, we argue that the cor-
porate credit-to-GDP ratio can similarly be used to reflect changes in the credit
conditions facing firms.
Finally, the main challenge in modelling commercial property values in the
case of Ireland is the absence of time series data on the supply of commercial
property. In this respect, we follow Whitley and Windram (2003) and use the pri-
vate capital stock per employee to approximate the effective stock of commercial
property.38 A priori, we expect that higher levels of the stock of commercial prop-
erty are associated with lower capital values. We model commercial capital val-
ues in an error-correction framework with the following long-run equilibrium:
ComV alt = α + β1User
c
t + β2RGDPt + β3(CorpCreditt/GDPt)
+ β4(KStockt/Empt) + εt (12)
whereComV al are real commercial property capital values,Userc is the user cost
of investment in commercial property,KStock is the private sector capital stock,
Emp is private sector employment, and ε is the equilibrium error.
Importantly, as construction firms are likely to engage in the development of
both commercial and residential property, we allow house prices to affect com-
mercial capital values in the short run. House prices reflect demand pressures
from the residential sector so that higher house prices attract resources away
from commercial real estate construction, thereby raising the value of commer-
38The 2015 data for the Irish private capital stock displayed a level shift relative to previous
years due to corporate restructuring and international asset transfers, which also generated out-
sized levels of depreciation. Accordingly, we construct a private capital stock for 2015 that is
consistent with previous years by using investment data that excludes investment in intangibles
and aircraft. The latter rose significantly as a result of this activity.
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cial property due to relatively lower supply. In this context, house prices repre-
sent the opportunity cost to construction firms of commercial real estate devel-
opment (Whitley and Windram, 2003).
The short-run capital values model also incorporates dynamics from changes
in the variables in (12) and in the corporate insolvency rate. The latter is included
as an indicator of investor sentiment similar to the unemployment rate in the
house price equation.
2.6. Mortgage Arrears and Corporate Insolvency
From a financial stability perspective, a key indicator of household financial dis-
tress is the level of mortgage arrears. The empirical literature on mortgage de-
fault and borrower payment delinquency tends to support the “double trigger”
modelling approach which posits that these events occur, not only because of
a weak net equity position, but also because of changes in affordability caused
by high debt service ratios, unemployment and lower expected income growth
(Bajari et al, 2008; Gerardi et al, 2010).39
The international evidence on the drivers of mortgage arrears tends to point
to both economic and financial factors as being important. For example, Gerardi
et al (2015) examine the relative importance of liquidity and equity factors in
mortgage distress among US households and show that job loss has an impact
on mortgage default equivalent to a 35-50 percent fall in home equity.
Using UK data, Whitley et al (2004), Figueira et al (2005), and Aron and Muell-
39Another approach to modelling mortgage default or delinquency uses an option pricing
model in which households choose to default once they have fallen into negative equity by a
certain amount (Deng et al, 2000). In the Irish case, such strategic default is limited by mortgage
contracts which give the lender full-recourse to the total amount outstanding.
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bauer (2010) find that income gearing and “undrawn equity” are important de-
terminants of arrears.40 In virtually all studies, unemployment is significantly
associated with higher rates of delinquency.
In the case of Ireland, several microeconomic studies use confidential regu-
latory loan-level data to investigate the drivers of mortgage arrears. Lydon and
McCarthy (2013) using loan-level data over the period 2008 to 2010 find that the
key drivers of arrears are unemployment and the debt service to income ratio.
Kelly and McCann (2016) examine the determinants of a mortgage being in long
term arrears using loan-level data for the period 2012 to 2013. They find that the
key economic factors that influence mortgage distress are again unemployment
and income gearing but show that mortgage interest rates and household equity
are also important.
Following the literature, we model mortgage arrears as a function of both
ability-to-pay and equity variables, with error-correction to the following long-
run relation:
Arrearst = α + β1HHEquityt + β2MorRatet + β3URatet
+ β4(MorStockt/Incomet) + εt (13)
where Arrears is the household mortgage arrears rate and εt is the stationary
equilibrium error term subsequently included in the short-run model, along
with lagged and contemporaneous changes in the variables in (13).
Financial distress among non-financial corporations is captured by the cor-
40Undrawn equity is the residual proportion of housing wealth net of mortgage debt. Note
that the variable capturing income gearing in these studies is typically the debt service ratio,
which incorporates the impact of both mortgage size and the mortgage interest rate. Recall that
in our framework, mortgage credit and the mortgage interest rate are endogenous variables and
therefore we include them separately in the arrears equation.
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porate insolvency rate. The literature on firm default and insolvency suggests
that financial factors such as indebtedness are important determinants of firms’
survival rate.41 However, real factors that reflect overall demand conditions such
as the unemployment rate are also important.
Vlieghe (2001) examines the determinants of the corporate liquidation rate in
the UK and finds that aggregate corporate indebtedness, as approximated by the
corporate debt-to-GDP ratio, interest rates, the output gap and collateral values
(captured by an index of property prices) all play an important role. Liu (2009)
also looks at the relation between corporate failure and macroeconomic factors
in the UK and shows that profits and GDP growth, in addition to interest rates
and credit, have a significant impact on the former.
Cross-country studies tend to yield similar results. For example, Hazak and
Mannasoo (2007) investigate which variables best predict company failure using
data for the European Union. Among the financial factors they consider, corpo-
rate leverage and real interest rates are positively associated with the probability
of insolvency. On the real side, higher rates of GDP growth are associated with a
lower probability of insolvency in ‘old’ member states.
There are few studies on the macroeconomic drivers of corporate insolven-
cies in the Irish context, particularly in terms of the role of financial factors. One
exception is Kelly et al (2015) who examine the impact of both macroeconomic
factors and credit conditions on Irish firms’ probability of survival. Consistent
with the international literature their results confirm that unemployment and
41That indebtedness should matter to a firm’s solvency is clearly a violation of the Modigliani
and Miller (1958) theorem, which as discussed in the next section in relation to bank capital,
suggests that the ratio of debt to equity in a firm’s funding structure should be irrelevant to the
value of the firm. However, two of the conditions necessary for this theorem to hold and which
are not supported empirically, are that firms can borrow at the prevailing market interest rate
and that there is no bankruptcy.
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credit growth have a significant impact on the insolvency rate. They also con-
struct a “credit gap”, similar to one we construct in section 4 according to the
Basel III regulatory framework, as an indicator of credit conditions and find that
new firms established during boom periods when credit conditions are relaxed
are less likely to survive than those established when credit conditions are rela-
tively tight.
Following these studies, we relate the corporate insolvency rate to both real
and financial factors. The unemployment rate is used to capture demand factors
that affect profitability, while the interest rate on corporate loans and the stock
of corporate credit relative to GDP capture the cost of credit and the indebted-
ness of firms, respectively. In addition to these indicators of debt service costs
and income gearing, changes in collateral values can affect firms’ ability to roll-
over existing debt and access short-term working capital (Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997). Declining property values may lead to tighter credit constraints and thus
increase vulnerability to adverse shocks for firms who cannot borrow to smooth
the temporary decline in income. We allow commercial property values to affect
the corporate insolvency rate to capture these constraints.
We model the corporate insolvency rate as error-correcting to the following
long-run relation:
Insolvt = α + β1ComV alt + β2RCorpRatet + β3URatet
+ β4(CorpCt/GDPt) + εt (14)
where εt represents the stationary equilibrium error. The short-run behaviour of
the insolvency rate is governed by lagged and contemporaneous changes in the
variables in (14).
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2.7. Bank Capital
In addition to liquidity requirements, the second channel through which macro-
prudential policy can affect credit supply is through banks’ capital structure.
Theoretically, the Modigliani-Miller “irrelevance proposition” (Modigliani and
Miller, 1958) posits that under certain conditions there is no optimal relation-
ship of equity to debt finance in the funding structure of a firm. In reality, these
conditions are rarely present for firms in general and for banks, in particular. For
example, debt financing tends to incur more favourable tax treatment in most
countries (De Mooij, 2012). In the case of banks, minimum capital requirements
are necessary to mitigate the potential moral hazard concerns associated with
holding publicly insured deposits. Given the higher cost of equity relative to
debt, banks may however be expected to hold no more than these minimum
requirements. Therefore, the typical corporate finance determinants of firms’
capital structure outside of regulation should have little explanatory power in
relation to banks (Gropp and Heider, 2010).
To the contrary, banks actually tend to manage their capital ratios and main-
tain capital buffers in excess of the regulatory minimum (Flannery and Rangan,
2008). Theoretically there may be several reasons for this.42 First, banks may
maintain these buffers so as not to trigger regulatory intervention if they acci-
dentally allow capital levels to fall below the regulatory minimum (Repullo and
Suarez, 2013). Also, due to asymmetric information, banks face significant costs
in issuing new equity at short notice and accordingly may hold buffers to avoid
these adjustment costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Second, banks may set capi-
42Under the Basel III framework, the minimum requirement for equity capital (CET1) is 4.5
percent of risk-weighted assets. In addition, the “capital conservation buffer” of 2.5 percent
should comprise CET1 capital. This means that total CET1 capital must comprise at least 7 per-
cent of risk-weighted assets ratio.
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tal ratios according to economic needs rather than as a consequence of purely
regulatory requirements. For example, banks may hold higher levels of capital
due to perceived risk exposures, earnings volatility, to signal soundness to credit
markets, or to be able to quickly avail of investment opportunities as they arise.
Finally, the ‘pecking order’ theory of the capital structure suggests that banks’
capital holdings may simply reflect a period of high profitability and thus the
recent path of retained earnings. Moreover, dividend payouts may signal to po-
tential investors that the bank is unable to exploit growth opportunities (Maurin
and Toivanen, 2012).
Empirically, capital ratios tend to be inversely correlated with banks’ size.
This may reflect greater diversification by large banks, economies of scale in
risk management, and easier access to equity finance due to lower informational
asymmetries (Gropp and Heider, 2010). This is also the case for larger banking
systems, as measured by the ratio of assets-to-GDP (Caprio et al, 2005). We use
the latter to proxy for lower capital adjustment costs, and thus greater ability to
manage capital ratios, that result from an expanding banking sector.
Microeconomic evidence also suggests that capital ratios are positively re-
lated to profitability indicating that retained earnings are an important source
of recapitalisation, which is consistent with the pecking order theory (Berger et
al, 2008; Mehran and Thakor, 2011). Unfortunately in the case of Ireland, data
on the profitability of the aggregate banking sector is limited. However, there is
a strong positive and robust relation between the slope of the yield curve and
bank profitability with the former in particular reflecting the returns from ma-
turity transformation (Alessandri and Nelson, 2015; Borio et al, 2017)43. In our
43A positive relation between the slope of the term structure and bank profitability suggests
that the positive impact of the term structure on net interest income is larger than the negative
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framework, these returns are given by the difference between lending rates and
funding costs.44 Accordingly, we use the spread between the weighted-average
of lending rates and the money market rate to reflect the profitability of the ag-
gregate banking sector.
There is considerable evidence that capital ratios are strongly procyclical (Dru-
mond, 2009). For some banks this may be due to a decline in the measured
Value-at-Risk (VaR) of assets during upswings as in Adrian and Shin (2014), while
for others it may indicate myopic management whereby capital buffers fall dur-
ing periods when equity is relatively cheap (Estrella, 2004; Jokipii and Milne,
2008). In terms of the latter, imbalances may accumulate during cyclical up-
turns and thus increase the likelihood of incurring large losses during downturns
(Borio et al, 2001, Brei and Gambacorta, 2016). Similar to Akram (2014), we use
the unemployment rate to capture these fluctuations in the capital ratio that are
attributable to the economic cycle and thus to changes in the perception of eco-
nomic risk.
Capital ratios also tend to be positively related to indicators of credit risk even
after controlling for cyclical factors (Ayuso et al, 2004; Milne and Jokipii, 2008).
Measuring credit risk at the banking sector level is difficult and although some
expost measures of this risk such as the rate of non-performing loans may serve
as suitable proxies, a sufficiently long series for this variable is not available for
Ireland. Instead, we focus on portfolio risk related to the concentration of lend-
impact on loan loss provisions (due to higher debt-servicing costs and probability of default) and
other non-interest income (via lower asset prices).
44Including the yield curve spread on government bonds in the bank capital equation would
mean that bank profitability would be exogenous in simulations. We are therefore endogenising
bank profitability by instead using the difference between lending rates and funding costs. We
use the money market rate to approximate the latter due to the large elasticities with respect to
lending rates estimated in the next section.
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ing in real estate as this is the loan category which tends to be the most volatile.
Following Martin-Oliver et al (2013) we use a simple measure of the exposure to
this risk given by the share of real estate lending in total lending. In addition,
we allow risk in the short-run to be reflected by fluctuations in asset values in
the household sector, as given by changes in house prices, and by the corporate
insolvency rate.45
As in the case of credit risk, measuring the impact of “market discipline” on
banks’ capital ratios at the aggregate level is difficult from both a definitional and
data availability perspective. However, some studies suggest that this impact op-
erates through the share of funding that is uninsured or that does not comprise
deposits (Nier and Baumann, 2006; Francis and Osbourne, 2010). For a given in-
crease in bank risk, non-deposit investors will demand higher yields, which will
accordingly reduce bank profitability. This effect rises with the share of liabili-
ties that are uninsured. To mitigate the pressure from market discipline, banks
may raise their capital ratio to reduce leverage and to signal lower solvency risk
to potential investors. The bank capital equation in our model uses the share of
deposits in total liabilities to capture this disciplinary impact of the market.
In summary, we model the capital ratio as adjusting to a long-run equilibrium
that depends on a number of factors related to the size of the banking sector,
profitability, cyclicality, risk exposure and market discipline:
CAPt = α + β1(Assetst/GDPt) + β2URatet + β3Spreadt
+ β4(CREt/Loanst + β5(Depositst/Liabilitiest) + εt (15)
45We also included house prices and the corporate insolvency rate in the long-run relation but
both were statistically insignificant.
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where CAPt is the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, Spreadt is the differ-
ence between a weighted-average of lending rates and the money market rate,
Assets andLiabilities are, respectively, the total assets and liabilities of the bank-
ing sector, and εt is the stationary equilibrium error.46 We allow for an error-
correction process to reflect the adjustment costs associated with raising new
equity. As mentioned above, the short-run model also allows the capital ratio to
respond to changes in house prices and the corporate insolvency rate, in addi-
tion to changes in the variables included in the long-run relation.
3. Results
We estimate the model presented in the previous section as a system using three-
stage least squares (3SLS) over the period 1988 Q1 to 2015 Q4.47 This estimator
allows us to capture contemporaneous spillovers between sectors and to instru-
ment for potentially endogenous variables.48 Although the equations are esti-
mated jointly, we discuss each individually here for expository reasons.
3.1. Mortgage Credit
Table 1 presents the results of the mortgage demand equations. All variables
are statistically significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The demand for
new mortgages exhibits moderate persistence with a coefficient of 0.715 on the
first lag. The dependent variable is the volume of new mortgages that are drawn
46Clearly, total assets must equal total liabilities. They are included separately here for intu-
ition.
47One exception is the mortgage arrears equation, which is estimated separately due to a
shorter sample length. Unit root test results for each variable are available from the author.
48We use lags of the potentially endogenous variable as instruments.
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down rather than approved. Therefore, past conditions in the mortgage market
when mortgages were approved can affect the current volume of new mortgage
credit actually obtained by households.
Our results suggest that affordability constraints or repayment capacity are
particularly important determinants of mortgage demand. The mortgage rate
has a negative impact indicating that the cost of credit is a statistically significant
contributing factor to the debt-service burden. However, it is real household dis-
posable income that appears to be the main factor driving mortgage affordabil-
ity. We find that collateral constraints also play a role. Higher house prices allow
households to obtain higher levels of mortgage credit for a given LTV ratio. In
our model this introduces procyclicality to mortgage lending similar to the ac-
celerator mechanism outlined in Almeida et al (2006) and provides motivation
for our simulations of countercyclical LTV rules in section 4.1.
The central motivation of this paper is to specify and quantify the channels
through which macroprudential policy operates. In this context, changes in
borrower-based instruments alter the credit conditions facing households. As
we have concentrated out the impact of cyclical factors on these instruments,
higher (lower) values for the LTI and LTV ratios imply a relaxation (tighening) of
affordability and collateral constraints, respectively.
Table 1 shows that these adjusted LTV and LTI ratios have a positive and sig-
nificant effect on the demand for mortgage credit. For example, a 1 percent in-
crease in the adjusted LTV ratio raises the volume of new mortgages by over 2.5
percent while a similar increase in the adjusted LTI ratio raises this volume by
over 1.5 percent in the long run.49 From a macroprudential perspective, these
49The long-run impact of each ratio is calculated by dividing the short-run coefficient in Table
1 by (1-0.715), where 0.715 is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. Duffy et al (2016)
41
results suggest that imposing restrictions on these ratios would potentially be
very effective in constraining credit growth in the case of Ireland. We discuss
this further in section 4.
The right panel of Table 1 shows how the volume of new mortgage credit ac-
cumulates on the outstanding stock of credit. The coefficient of 0.982 indicates
how much of the latter remains after net mortgage repayments. We impose the
unitary coefficient on new mortgage credit in the current period to reflect a per-
petual inventory process.
Table 2 presents the results of the mortgage supply equation. The top panel
shows the coefficients on the variables driving the nominal mortgage interest
rate in the long run while those in the bottom panel are the coefficients of the
error-correction model. Both indicators of funding costs have a positive and
significant effect on the mortgage rate, although the long-run elasticity of the
latter with respect to the money market rate is much higher than with respect
to the deposit rate. A one percentage point increase in the money market rate
raises the mortgage rate by 77 basis points in the long run compared to 18 basis
points for a similar increase in the deposit rate.
The variables representing macroeconomic risk and risk specific to lending
to the household sector are also significant. Higher rates of unemployment gen-
erate greater repayment risk which leads to a compensatory increase in mort-
gage rates. Similarly, higher levels of home equity imply lower rates of loss given
default which allows banks to reduce mortgage rates.
We also find evidence that macroprudential policy could have a significant
impact on the pricing of mortgage lending. Restrictions on the LTD ratio lead to
banks substituting away from wholesale funding at the margin towards relatively
find similar results using different data.
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more expensive deposits with these higher costs “passed-through” to higher mort-
gage rates. The introduction of higher capital buffers would also raise lending
rates as banks try to generate earnings through higher net interest margins to
achieve the required capital ratios. The coefficient on the (log) capital ratio im-
plies that a one percentage point increase in this ratio raises the mortgage inter-
est rate by approximately nine basis points. This is within the range of estimates
found in the literature.50
The coefficient on the error-correction term indicates that the mortgage rate
adjusts quite quickly (within a year) to the long-run equilibrium. Changes in the
money market rate, the deposit rate and in the capital ratio contribute additional
dynamics to the mortgage rate in the short run. We also included changes in the
unemployment rate, LTD ratio and household equity in the short-run model but
these were insignificant.51
3.2. Consumer Credit
Table 3 presents the results for the supply of and demand for consumer credit.
The long-run demand for consumer credit is mainly driven by income and house-
hold equity. Recall that the dependent variable in the demand equation is the
(notional) stock of consumer credit so that a one percent increase in income is
associated with a 0.5 percent increase in this stock. The coefficient on house-
50Estimates of the impact of a one percentage point increase in capital requirements on lend-
ing rates range from 2 to 20 basis points. See Dagher et al (2016) for a survey of the literature
on the pass-through of changes in capital to lending rates. We discuss this literature further in
section 4.2.
51Most of the equations include time dummies for particular quarters that are clear outliers
such as during the ERM crisis of 1992-1993 or the financial crisis. These are periods of excep-
tional volatility that are unrelated to changes in the underlying determinants of the variable but
which affect the coefficient estimates if their impact is not controlled for.
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hold equity is quite large but reflects the rising “spendability” of housing wealth
over our sample period. Interestingly, the long-run coefficient on net financial
wealth is much smaller and only weakly significant. One potential explanation
for this finding is that housing represents Irish households’ main asset so that
the “wealth effect” of housing is much greater than for financial assets. In ad-
dition, financial assets mainly comprise pensions and technical reserves and so
are relatively illiquid.
We also find that the interest (semi-) elasticity of consumer credit demand is
relatively low. In our model, this has implications for the strength of the trans-
mission of intermediary-based macroprudential instruments to the household
and corporate sectors and, ultimately, for the size and composition of banks’ bal-
ance sheets. As these instruments operate through lending rates, a low interest
elasticity of credit demand will weaken the impact of these instruments, all else
equal.
The error-correction model is characterised by adjustment to the equilibrium
given by the long-run coefficients above and by additional dynamics from hous-
ing wealth and income. We also find that shocks to consumer credit itself gener-
ate persistence in its behaviour in the short run.
On the supply side, we find evidence that funding costs, risk and balance
sheet or macroprudential factors all drive the consumer lending rate in the long
run. A particularly interesting finding is that the elasticity of the lending rate with
respect to the deposit rate is much higher than with respect to the money market
rate. For example, a one percentage point increase in the latter raises the con-
sumer interest rate by 33 basis points, whereas a similar increase in the deposit
rate raises the consumer rate by 66 basis points. As we use the money market
rate to reflect changes in the central bank’s policy rate, our results suggest that
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the pass-through of monetary policy changes is much lower for the consumer
rate than for either the mortgage or corporate lending (discussed below) rates.
In terms of risk, the consumer credit-to-income ratio appears to be a more
important factor in the pricing of consumer lending than the unemployment
rate. Both variables are used to approximate repayment capacity but the more
specific measure of lending risk may more accurately capture the debt-service
burden or income-gearing ratio that influences bank lending.
The elasticity of the consumer lending rate with respect to both lender-based
macroprudential instruments is the largest across all lending rates. This result
would be expected a priori in the case of the capital ratio, as consumer lend-
ing is unsecured and is potentially the riskiest type of lending. For example, a
one percentage point increase in this ratio increases the consumer lending rate
by approximately 11 basis points in the long run. The large coefficient on the
LTD ratio reflects our finding that Irish banks tend to rely on relatively more ex-
pensive deposit funding when setting consumer lending rates. Holding all other
variables constant, a higher LTD ratio implies that banks are using proportion-
ately more wholesale funding at the margin and this leads to lower lending rates
than would otherwise prevail.
Similar to the mortgage rate, the consumer lending rate exhibits relatively fast
error-correction, with adjustment to the long-run equilibrium occurring after
approximately one year. Short-run dynamics in the consumer rate are mainly
determined by changes to funding costs and to the capital ratio.
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3.3. Corporate Credit
Table 4 presents the results for the demand for each type of corporate credit. We
find that the long-run demand for construction and real estate credit is more
procyclical than that for non-property related corporate credit and is more sen-
sitive to the value of collateral. For example, a one percentage rise in the value
of commercial property is associated with 0.83 percent rise in the stock of cor-
porate lending to the real estate sector but only a 0.35 rise in corporate credit to
other sectors.
The demand for credit by construction and real estate firms is also more sen-
sitive to the cost of credit than that by other firms. As discussed above, the inter-
est elasticity of credit demand is an important determinant of the strength of the
impact of macroprudential instruments that directly affect the behaviour of fi-
nancial intermediaries. In this case and holding all other variables constant, any
given increase in the corporate lending rate due to changes in these instruments
will affect the stock of property related corporate credit more than the stock of
non-property corporate credit in the long run. Ultimately, they will affect both
the size and composition of the stock of total corporate lending on banks’ bal-
ance sheets.
As construction firms supply both residential and commercial real estate, the
value of the housing stock is included along with the value of commercial prop-
erty to indicate the value of both types of collateral. The long-run coefficients on
both variables are broadly similar with demand elasticities close to unity.
We find that the demand for non-property related credit is inversely related to
firms’ profits in the long-run. One obvious explanation for this is that Irish firms
are predominantly small and medium enterprises for which external borrowing
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is relatively expensive due to information asymmetries. The pecking-order the-
ory of the liability structure suggests that firms will prefer to first use retained
profits to finance investment before turning to external sources.
The error-correction models for both credit aggregates are characterised by
significant but relatively slow adjustment to the long-run equilibrium relation.
Short-run persistence in construction and real estate credit is mainly due to own
shocks, although there is some evidence that changes to the cost of credit also
play a role. The short-run behaviour of non-property corporate credit is influ-
enced by both its own shocks and shocks to corporate profits, real GDP and the
value of commercial property
In terms of supply, Table 5 shows that funding costs, corporate risk and the
two macroprudential instruments are all significant determinants of the interest
rate on loans extended to non-financial corporations. The elasticity of the cor-
porate lending rate with respect to the money market rate is the highest across all
three lending rates and is correspondingly the lowest with respect to the deposit
rate. A one percentage point increase in the money market rate raises the corpo-
rate rate by 81 basis points, while a similar increase in the deposit rate raises the
latter by 16 basis points.
Our indicators of financial stress in the corporate sector suggest that credit
risk is also an important factor that banks consider when setting interest rates
on corporate loans. The corporate credit-to-GDP ratio represents an approxi-
mate measure of the firms’ income gearing and reflects the impact of a higher
debt service burden on repayment capacity. Recall also that we relate the corpo-
rate insolvency rate to indicators of firms’ balance sheet strength so this variable
provides an indirect channel through which the latter affects the cost of borrow-
ing. Higher interest rates in turn lead to lower credit demand and ultimately, to
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lower commercial capital values. This link between balance sheet strength and
the cost of credit generates similar “accelerator” effects to those outlined in, for
example, Bernanke et al (1996).
It is particularly interesting to compare the coefficients on capital and LTD
ratios with those of the mortgage and consumer credit supply equations. Taken
together, they indicate the relative strength of each margin along which banks
adjust to potential changes in regulatory policy. The elasticity of the corporate
lending rate to changes in the LTD ratio is between that of the mortgage and
consumer rates while the elasticity of the corporate lending rate to changes in
the capital ratio is the lowest across all lending rates. Comparing the latter elas-
ticities across lending rates, a one percentage point increase in the capital ratio
raises the consumer, mortgage and corporate rates by eleven, nine and seven
basis points, respectively.
Table 5 also shows that the short-run dynamics of the corporate rate are mainly
determined by error-correction and by shocks to the money market rate and
capital ratio. The speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium relation is
broadly similar to the other lending rates, which suggests that it generally takes
approximately one year for nominal interest rates to fully respond to shocks in
the variables that drive their long-run behaviour.
3.4. Housing and Commercial Property
Table 6 presents the results of the equations for the demand for both housing
and commercial property. All variables are statistically significant with the ex-
pected signs. The equations have similar functional forms that relate the price of
each type of property to corresponding measures of user cost of capital, income,
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credit conditions and property supply. The user cost of capital appears to have
an almost identical impact on the demand for each type of property, although
the coefficient is quite small. The main impact of credit markets on house prices
and commercial capital values appears to operate through the credit conditions
channel, as captured by the mortgage credit-to-income and corporate credit-to-
GDP ratios. For example, a one percentage point increase in the mortgage credit-
to-income ratio raises real house prices by approximately 1.3 percent, while a
one percentage point increase in the corporate credit-to-GDP ratio raises com-
mercial capital values by approximately 2 percent.
We also find evidence consistent with the literature that property prices are
strongly procyclical. This is particularly the case for commercial property with a
unitary elasticity on the real GDP coefficient and partially explains the steep rise
and decline in capital values over the last two decades. From a stress-testing and
financial stability perspective, the derived demand for both commercial space
and residential housing are therefore significant contributors to fluctuations in
the asset prices that secure much of Irish banks’ lending.
Table 6 also shows how the value of each type of property varies inversely with
its supply. A larger housing stock relative to the number of people wishing to
form households implies that the residential housing stock is expanding relative
to demand and this increase in the effective supply exerts downward pressure on
house prices. Similarly, an increase in the stock of commercial property relative
to the number of employees expands the effective supply of commercial space
and dampens the appreciation in capital values. We emphasise however, that
we are using the total private capital stock as an approximation for the stock of
commercial property and therefore the coefficient on this variable should carry
this caveat.
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The short-run models of house prices and capital values show that the error-
correction tends to occur at a similar speed to each of the credit stocks. Short-
run persistence in house prices is mainly driven by own shocks with additional
dynamics from changes in income, the unemployment rate and credit condi-
tions. House prices also affect capital values in the short-term as construction
firms in both the residential and commercial property sectors compete for the
same resources. Similar to the unemployment rate in the house price error-
correction model, the corporate insolvency rate is included in the model of com-
mercial capital values to capture investor sentiment and uncertainty. The coef-
ficients on these variables suggest that their effects tend to be quite small.
Table 7 presents the results of our housing supply model.52 Housing comple-
tions display a high level of persistence, which is unsurprising considering the
lags that are intrinsic to the construction process.
We find that the Tobin’s Q model is an empirically valid representation of res-
idential investment in the Irish case. One of the key drivers of housing construc-
tion is the ratio of house prices to building costs, which we use to reflect the
value of the housing stock relative to its replacement cost. Higher values of Q
indicate that the profitability of construction is increasing so that a one percent
increase in this ratio leads to a 1.6 percent increase in the supply of new housing
units in the long run.
Both the cost and growth rate of credit are significant and have the expected
signs. As the interest rate on construction credit is likely to be higher than the
representative corporate rate, the coefficient on the latter likely constitutes a
52Recall that as we use the total private sector capital stock as an approximation of the supply
of commercial property we treat the latter as exogenous. Endogenising the private capital stock
would require a much larger macroeconomic model and is therefore beyond the scope of this
paper.
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lower bound on the effects of interest rates on housing supply. Measuring changes
in the availability of construction credit is difficult given data availability. How-
ever, as we control for both the cost of credit and cyclical factors affecting hous-
ing completions, the growth rate of property-related corporate credit should pro-
vide an approximate indicator of general credit conditions facing construction
firms. Accordingly, we find that higher growth rates are associated with higher
levels of building activity by these firms.
The coefficients on the output gap and insolvency rate suggest that uncer-
tainty and sentiment also play a role on the supply side. These indicators are
used to reflect mean-preserving shifts in the distribution of future housing prices
and thus changing perceptions about the future profitability of residential in-
vestment. We interpret our results as suggesting that construction firms’ un-
certainty falls as the macroeconomic environment improves and as the level of
corporate distress falls. This consequently generates an increase in the number
of new housing units.
Finally, we include the growth in the share of 25 to 39 year olds in the total
population to capture desired levels of household formation and to provide a de-
mographic context to interpret shifts in the quantity of completions over time.53
We find that the change in this share has a positive and significant effect on the
supply of new housing units. Clearly, this is a slow-moving variable and is there-
fore more likely to explain underlying trends rather than any higher frequency
fluctuations in housing supply.
53We also considered alternative specifications in which the level of completions is itself scaled
by a demographic indicator. These specifications yielded an inferior out-of-sample fit to that
outlined in Table 7.
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3.5. Mortgage Arrears and Corporate Insolvency
We now turn to the indicators of stress in the household and corporate sectors.
Table 8 highlights the role of financial factors in determining the rate of house-
hold mortgage arrears and corporate insolvencies. In particular, the debt-to-
income ratio, which together with the cost of credit, reflect the debt-service bur-
den, appears to be the key driver of both measures of economic distress. For
example, a one percentage point increase in the mortgage credit-to-income ra-
tio raises the household mortgage arrears rate by approximately 18 basis points,
while a similar increase in the non-property corporate credit-to-GDP ratio raises
the corporate insolvency rate by approximately three basis points. Importantly,
these results suggest that financial regulators and macroprudential policymak-
ers need to pay particular attention to the income gearing of both households
and firms when assessing risks to financial stability.
In addition, adverse shocks to the value of assets used to secure lending can
lead to higher rates of delinquency. For households, we find that a one percent
fall in home equity raises the mortgage arrears rate by 12 basis points. Recall that
mortgages extended by Irish banks are typically full-recourse so that in the event
that home equity becomes negative households cannot simply exit the mortgage
contract by surrendering the collateral to the lender. As we control for factors
that affect debt-servicing capacity, our results may provide some evidence how-
ever that households engage in strategic default when home equity falls. For
firms, fluctuations in the value of commercial property are more likely to reflect
changes in net worth and the concomitant ability to obtain working capital when
they are liquidity constrained. Interestingly, our results suggest that this chan-
nel is quite weak with a one percent increase in the value of commercial property
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(net of corporate bank credit) reducing the corporate insolvency rate by less than
one basis point.
The final long-run determinant of both arrears and insolvencies is the un-
employment rate. The latter is included to reflect changes in the macroeco-
nomic environment and the impact this has on the debt repayment capacity
of households and firms. We find that the unemployment rate has a positive
significant long-run effect on both stress indicators. Further, the results of the
error-correction model show that changes in the unemployment rate also have
a significant effect on the arrears and insolvency rate in the short term.
We find that the adjustment of household arrears to the long-run equilibrium
occurs at approximately one-third of the speed of the insolvency rate, although
the shorter sample length of the former likely makes it more difficult to estimate
this coefficient accurately. The short-run dynamics of mortgage arrears are also
affected by shocks to the mortgage interest rate and household equity, while the
insolvency rate is driven by its own shocks and those to the value of commercial
property.
3.6. Bank Capital
Table 9 presents the estimation results of the bank capital equation. Banks’ capi-
tal ratios tend to decline as the banking sector expands. The most obvious expla-
nation for this is that banks find it easier to raise capital at short notice in larger
banking systems, perhaps due to lower information asymmetries and more liq-
uid capital markets. We also find that banks maintain higher levels of capital
when unemployment is rising. For example, a one percentage increase in the
unemployment rate is associated with a 50 basis points increase in the ratio
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of capital to risk-weighted assets. This indicates that the capital ratios of Irish
banks are strongly procyclical as banks raise precautionary buffers and increase
provisions against potential loan impairment. It is this feature of capital ratios
that the Basel III regulatory framework seeks to address by requiring banks to
increase capital buffers in “good” times when it is relatively less expensive to do
so. We discuss this procyclicality further in section 4.2.
Our results suggest that the capital ratio is positively related to the spread be-
tween interest rates and funding costs. This reflects the ability of banks to raise
capital through retained earnings consistent with the pecking order theory of the
capital structure. We also find that capital ratios are increasing in the exposure
of banks to the real estate sector. This is mainly due to the greater volatility of
this sector relative to other types of lending which leads to banks holding higher
levels of capital as a precaution.
The composition of banks’ liabilities is also an important driver of capital
holdings in the long run. We find that the capital ratio is inversely related to
the share of deposit funding in total liabilities. As banks with a falling share of
deposit relative to wholesale funding are more vulnerable to rollover or liquidity
risk, “market discipline” may require these banks to hold higher levels of capital.
The estimated coefficient suggests that a one percentage point fall in the share
of deposits in total liabilities raises the capital ratio by approximately 16 basis
points.
Table 9 also shows that bank capital exhibits significant but relatively slow
error-correction. The speed of adjustment reflects the presence of adjustment
costs that generate inertia in the capital ratio. These rigidities may need to be
considered by regulators and macroprudential policymakers when changing cap-
ital buffer requirements. In addition to persistence arising from the growth of the
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banking sector, the short-run behaviour of bank capital is also driven by shocks
to the riskiness of lending and collateral values, as indicated by changes in the
corporate insolvency rate and house prices, respectively.
Finally, as a complement to the R2 as a measure of goodness-of-fit that is
presented in each table, Figure 1 shows the fitted values for each variable as pre-
dicted by the model relative to each variables actual historical value. The in-
sample fit of each variable corresponds closely to actual values over the sample,
although there is some evidence of instability in the housing completions equa-
tion during the late 1990s and early 2000s.54
We now illustrate how our model and broader framework could be used by a
macroprudential authority to examine the potential impact of different instru-
ments on the banking and real estate sectors.
4. State Dependence and Counterfactual Scenarios
Given the calamitous impact of the collapse of the housing bubble on the Irish
economy, and on the banking sector in particular, an important question from a
policymaker’s perspective is the extent to which this could have been mitigated
had a different financial regulation framework been in operation. Through the
counterfactual scenarios that our model can generate, we can create “alternative
histories” that highlight and quantify how targeting distortions through macro-
prudential policy might have significantly reduced real and financial volatility
in the Irish case. We focus on one borrower-based instrument, the LTV ratio,
and one lender-based instrument, the CCyB, to illustrate their differential real
54Formal statistical tests for a structural break do not indicate that this instability significantly
changes the relation between completions and its covariates.
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effects.
4.1. Countercyclical Rules for LTV Ratios
To simulate these counterfactual scenarios, we need to assume a likely reac-
tion function for the macroprudential authority, one that is countercyclical and
rules-based.55 The effectiveness of borrower-based macroprudential instruments
are likely to be state-dependent as regulatory restrictions on maximum LTV and
LTI ratios may only bind at certain stages of the economic (or financial) cycle. A
passive macroprudential stance in terms of this cycle can generate strong pro-
cyclicality in credit and house price (Almeida, 2006). As discussed below, the
Basel III framework aims to dampen the financial cycle with the introduction of
instruments, such as the countercylical capital buffer (CCyB), that aim to mit-
igate the growth of systemic risk that follows the procyclical expansion of the
balance sheets of financial intermediaries. Thus, a macro
In addition, the rules-based aspect to macroprudential instruments, such as
that specified for the CCyB, are attractive from a financial stability perspective
as they are transparent, easy to understand, and predictable. While the CCyB is
focused on the procyclical leverage of the institutions that supply credit, similar
countercyclical rules that seek to limit the procyclical indebtedness of borrowers
through adjustment of the ceiling on the LTV ratio could also be considered to
be an effective tool in maintaining financial stability.56
Several studies have examined the welfare impact of different types of LTV
55Our simulations focus on countercyclical rules for the LTV ratio only. However, similar rules
could also be specified for the LTI ratio.
56The Basel Committee on the Global Financial System has emphasised the potential role of
a countercyclical LTV ratio as an automatic stabiliser in maintaining financial stability (CGFS,
2010).
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rules using calibrated DSGE models. For example, Christensen and Meh (2011)
examine the behaviour of a countercyclical LTV rule in a DSGE model with hous-
ing providing the main source of collateral. In their model, the regulator controls
the LTV specified in mortgage contracts and adjusts the ratio according to the
deviation of mortgage credit from its steady state value. Thus, the policymaker
lowers the LTV ratio during periods of excessive credit growth and raises the ratio
when credit growth is relatively weak. Similarly, Lambertini et al (2013) consider
a macroprudential policy rule for the LTV ratio that behaves countercyclically.
They find that LTV rules that respond to credit growth lead to higher welfare than
rules that respond to house prices or GDP growth as the former generate a more
stable supply of credit.
Our framework can be used to evaluate the stabilising properties of different
types of LTV rules, as well as to make some inferences about their impact on
welfare. Accordinly, we now consider scenarios in which the LTV ratio follows
a rule whereby it varies inversely with a particular indicator of the economic or
financial cycle. We follow Lambertini et al (2013) and specify rules for the LTV
ratio with the following form:
LTVt = νmLTVt−1 + (1 − νm)LTVss − (1 − νm)φx(xt − xt−1) (16)
where νm is an autoregressive parameter that is set to 0.5, LTVss is the steady-
state value of the LTV ratio, which is set to the average LTV over the sample pe-
riod, and φx is the response of the LTV to the cyclical indicator xt, which can
represent house price, credit or GDP growth.57 Note that the final term on the
57The results are qualitatively similar for different values of the autoregressive parameter and
are available on request. We include GDP growth as a cyclical indicator for completeness al-
though it is exogenous in each scenario. Thus, the scenarios based on this indicator show the
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right-hand side is negative so that the rule is countercyclical. Similar to Lamber-
tini et al (2013), we consider the rule for different values of φx between 1 and 7.
These models are solved over the period 2000 Q3 to 2015 Q4 and we compare the
results to the baseline scenario in which the LTV ratio is exogenous.
Although our framework does not explicitly specify utility functions as is typ-
ical in DSGE models, we can compare the different rules along dimensions that
matter for household welfare. In this respect, the relative impact on household
welfare of each rule could be assessed via the level of the housing stock, hous-
ing equity, and mortgage arrears that are generated by each rule. The housing
stock is often used to approximate the consumption of housing services (Duca
et al, 2011), while household equity and mortgage arrears have been shown to
be a key driver of non-housing consumption (Mian and Sufi, 2011; Kaplan et al,
2015).
Table 10 shows the percentage change in the mean and standard deviation
(in parenthesis) relative to the baseline of the key mortgage and housing mar-
kets variables under each type of rule and for different values of the sensitiv-
ity parameter φx.58 In terms of welfare, the credit-based rule for the LTV ratio
achieves the greatest reduction in the average level of mortgage arrears and the
largest increase in average levels of household equity. However, to the extent
that home ownership or the consumption of housing services matters for wel-
fare, an LTV rule that targets house price growth leads to the smallest reduction
in the housing stock relative to the baseline. This is a result of the fall in house
prices being lower relative to that under the other rules. However, it is impor-
impact of these rules on credit and housing markets, conditional on the historical evolution of
GDP.
58We focus in these variables to simplify the exposition. The mean and standard variation
under each rule for all other variables in the model are available from the author on request.
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tant to note that the differences between the rules in terms of the housing stock
are relatively small (approximately one percentage point) while those in terms of
arrears and household equity are much larger. Therefore, our analysis suggests
that the smallest reduction in welfare relative to the baseline of not adopting
rules for the LTV ratio, is achieved by those rules that target credit growth.
Of primary interest from a macroprudential perspective are the stabilisation
properties of each rule in terms of the extent to which each rule reduces the
volatility of particular prices and quantities and thus dampens boom and bust
cycles in credit and house prices. Table 10 shows that, among the three types
of rules, the credit rule leads to the lowest variability, or fall in standard devia-
tion, across all variables. In particular, LTV rules that target credit growth achieve
greater stability in house prices when compared to rules that explicitly target
house prices. In our framework, this is due to weaker feedback from house prices
to credit growth relative to the impact of credit growth on house prices. More
stable house prices lead to greater stability in housing supply via Tobin’s Q in
the housing completions equation, which accordingly generates more balanced
growth in the housing stock.
Table 10 also highlights how targeting credit growth significantly reduces the
volatility of mortgage arrears relative to other cyclical indicators. Stabilising the
growth of mortgage credit also stabilises income gearing and household equity,
which are the key determinants of mortgage arrears in the model. The variability
of the latter falls significantly under all rules, but particularly those that directly
respond to credit growth.
We now illustrate how the path of credit and housing markets might have
evolved during the ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ periods had the credit-based rule for the
LTV ratio been in operation in an Irish context. Figure 2 shows the counterfac-
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tual path of the housing and mortgage market variables in percent or percentage
point deviation from the actual path. If the Irish macroprudential policy author-
ity had adjusted the LTV ratio in response to credit growth from 2002 onwards, it
is clear that the build-up of mortgage debt would have been much lower in the
pre-crisis period.
Our model suggests that, depending on the value of φc, new mortgage lending
would have been between 35 and 75 percent lower in 2007 resulting in a mort-
gage stock that was between 20 and 50 percent lower prior to the onset of the
global financial crisis. As a result, house price growth would have been between
10 and 20 percent lower in the pre-crisis period but would have been signifi-
cantly higher after the onset of crisis. Lower house prices reduce the profitabil-
ity of housing investment and thus would have precipitated significantly lower
housing construction. As a result, the overhang of residential properties that de-
veloped as a result of the construction boom in Ireland would likely not have
materialised.
The lower level of housing construction would also have significantly reduced
the demand commercial real estate credit by between 10 and 23 percent, de-
pending on the parameterisation of φc. The spillovers between both commercial
and residential real estate markets in the mode are also evident as commercial
capital values fall between 7 and 15 percent. The fall in collateral values further
generates a decline in the demand for non-property corporate credit, while the
fall in house prices relative to their historical baseline would have led to a lower
demand for consumer loans through the wealth effect.
The counterfactual lower levels of collateral values also implies that interest
rates would have been higher. The simulation results suggest that, if the Irish
macroprudential authority had followed a credit-based rule for the LTV ratio,
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mortgage rates could have been up to 20 basis points higher, corporate rates up
to 40 basis points higher, and consumer rates up to 80 basis points higher prior to
the onset of the financial crisis. Lending rates subsequently fall back to baseline
values in-line with collateral values.
From a financial stability perspective however, perhaps the most important
impact of the rules would have been on household mortgage arrears. Our sim-
ulations show, that a credit-based LTV rule would have prevented much of the
build-up of arrears in the post-crisis period and that for intermediate to high
values of φc, would have eliminated arrears almost completely.
4.2. Countercyclical Capital Buffer
A key component of the Basel III regulatory framework is the introduction of a
countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) that is proportional to the difference be-
tween the private sector credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-run trend. The Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) has outlined a standardised approach for cal-
culating this gap for euro area economies. The credit-to-GDP ratio is defined as
the ratio of private non-financial sector credit to nominal GDP, while the trend
ratio is estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.59 The “credit gap” is the de-
viation from trend and the buffer is activated once the gap exceeds 2 percentage
points. The size of the buffer increases linearly from 0 to 2.5 percentage points
until the credit gap exceeds 10 percentage points, above which the 2.5 percent-
age point maximum is applied.
Figure 3 shows the “real-time credit gap” that Irish policymakers would have
been able to contemporaneously estimate prior to and in the aftermath of the
59The trend in the credit-to-GDP ratio is estimated using a one-sided HP filter with the
smoothing parameter, λ, set to 400,000.
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financial crisis. The credit gap exceeded the lower threshold of the CCyB in 1998
and remained at or close to the upper threshold until early 2003, after which it
stayed above this threshold until mid-2010. As previously mentioned, the period
since 2010 has coincided with substantial private sector deleveraging, which is
reflected in the sharp decline in the gap.
We now consider what the impact on credit and housing markets might have
been if the CCyB component of the Basel III framework had been in operation
during the boom and bust episode. We simulate a counterfactual scenario in
which the capital ratio is raised by 2.5 percentage points from 2000 Q1 to 2010
Q2, by 1.5 percentage points in 2010 Q3, and falls back to its baseline value there-
after.60
Figure 4 illustrates the impact on the banking and property sectors of these
higher capital requirements. Banks respond to the latter by raising lending rates.
As discussed in section 3, a particularly interesting result from the estimation of
the model is the differential rates of pass-through from changes in the capital
ratio to different lending rates. Pass-through is highest for the lending rate on
consumer loans, which rises by up to 30 basis points relative to the baseline of
no change in capital requirements over the simulation period. This is followed
by the mortgage interest rate, which increases by up to 25 basis points and by
the corporate interest rate, which rises by 20 basis points over the period. Each
interest rate returns to baseline approximately 1.5 years after the CCyB has fallen
to zero.
60Clearly, such sharp movements in the CCyB are not realistic as macroprudential authorities
are likely to smooth changes in capital requirements given the uncertainty in measuring the
credit gap and the adjustment costs incurred by banks in meeting these requirements. Thus,
these simulation results are more illustrative of the long-run impacts of the CCyB rather than the
short-term dynamics it might have generated.
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The impact of higher capital requirements on the volume of credit depends
not only on the change in interest rates, but also on the estimated interest elas-
ticity of demand for each type of credit. Figure 4 shows that new mortgage lend-
ing is on average 2 percent lower relative to baseline at the credit gap’s peak,
which results in a mortgage stock that is approximately 1.4 percent lower. The
difference in the estimated interest elasticity of demand for different types of
corporate credit is highlighted by the significantly weaker response of non-property
related credit relative to CRE loans. The former is 0.3 percent lower at the onset
of the crisis, while the latter is almost 1.4 percent lower. Similarly, while con-
sumer loan interest rates are most sensitive to higher capital ratios, the demand
for consumer loans falls 0.5 percent less relative to baseline than CRE loans and
mortgages.
These findings are broadly similar to other studies on the impact of capital re-
quirements on lending rates and credit growth. For example, BCBS (2010) uses a
number of different models to assess the impact of higher capital requirements
on the economy using data for 15 countries and finds, depending on the model
and country, that a 1 percentage point increase in the capital ratio raises lending
rates by between 5 and 26 basis points. This increase in lending rates results in a
reduction in the volume of credit of 1.5 percent. De Resende, Dib and Perevalov
(2010) use a sample of Canadian banks to assess the impact of higher capital
requirements. Their results suggest that a 2.5 percentage point increase in cap-
ital requirements would reduce lending volumes by approximately 1 percent.
Farook (2014) findings suggest that a 2.5 percentage point increase in capital re-
quirements raises lending rates by approximately 25 basis points in the case of
Norway with credit to households and firms falling by 0.6 and 0.9 percent, re-
spectively in the long term.
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In terms of the real effects of higher capital requirements, Figure 4 shows that
the impact of the CCyB on the property sector is also quite weak. Both commer-
cial property capital values and house prices are approximately 0.5 percent lower
by the onset of the financial crisis. The small decline in house prices relative to
baseline generates a weak response from housing supply with the completion of
new housing units and the housing stock falling by 3 percent and 0.3 percent,
respectively, by 2008. The sharp recovery in property values once the CCyB has
fallen to zero is due to the higher demand for housing services that results from
the lower level of the housing stock relative to demographics.61 This feeds back
into the mortgage and construction lending equations and ultimately into the
housing supply component of the model.
Finally, Figure 4 indicates that the impact of the CCyB in terms of reducing
the rate of mortgage arrears and corporate insolvency is significantly weaker
than that of borrower-based macroprudential instruments such as limits on LTI
and LTV ratios. Mortgage arrears are approximately 1.5 percentage points lower
relative to baseline by the end of the simulation period, while the impact on the
corporate insolvency rate is negligible.
Raising capital buffers as lending expands may be important from a finan-
cial stability perspective in terms of enhancing the resilience of banks’ balance
sheets to lending that becomes impaired in a downturn. Our simulation results
indicate that the economic cost of higher capital requirements in terms of rais-
ing the cost of credit and reducing the volume of credit extended by the banking
sector appears to be small. However, in terms of dampening the financial cy-
61Recall that the demand for housing services is captured by the ratio of the housing stock to
the population of 25 to 39 year olds. The latter is exogenous in the model and therefore remains
at historical values in these simulations.
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cle, our counterfactual scenarios suggest that borrower-based instruments such
as limits on the LTI and LTV ratios are more effective in terms of generating a
stable path for credit and house price growth. This stability by itself could mit-
igate the macroprudential necessity for increasing capital buffers as lower asset
and income gearing by households (and non-financial corporations) reduces the
frequency and magnitude of adverse shocks to the asset side of banks’ balance
sheets.
5. Conclusion
We develop a structural model that formalises and quantifies the bidirectional
linkages between the banking and real estate sectors. Our framework explicitly
characterises the dynamic nature of the interactions, feedbacks and spillovers
between macroprudential policy, bank’s lending behaviour, household and cor-
porate borrowing, and fluctuations in property prices. Importantly from a fi-
nancial stability perspective, our model shows that the usual indicators of dis-
tress in the household and corporate sectors such as mortgage arrears and in-
solvency rates have important financial triggers, which subsequently feed back
into banks’ loan-pricing decisions.
We find that both intermediary- and borrower-based macroprudential in-
struments can a significant impact on the supply of credit and demand for credit,
respectively. On the demand side, the LTV and LTI ratios determine credit condi-
tions in the mortgage market by relaxing or tightening collateral and affordabil-
ity constraints. On the supply side, the capital and LTD ratios constrain banks’
liability structure and ultimately affect the cost of credit. We find that there is
a differential response to changes in these ratios across lending rates, which re-
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flects how banks adjust to changes in macroprudential policy.
We also illustrate the potential use of our model for macroprudential policy
and financial stability analysis. We consider two counterfactual scenarios that
show how the banking and real estate markets might have evolved if a macro-
prudential regime had been in operation. First, after showing how the LTV might
have been calibrated under different rules and different target variables, we find
that an LTV ratio that responded to credit growth would have achieved the great-
est degree of macrofinancial stabilisation over the simulation period.
Our second scenario illustrates the potential impact of lender-based instru-
ments. We find that the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer would
have had a much weaker impact on credit and property prices relative to that of
borrower-based instruments such as the LTV ratio, primarily due to the low in-
terest elasticity of credit demand. Therefore, notwithstanding the enhancement
in banks’ balance sheet resilience that the CCyB generates, its impact on real and
financial volatility is relatively weak.
Finally, the framework we have outlined in this paper could provide a key in-
put in the design of ‘top-down’ stress test scenarios for banks’ balance sheets. In
particular, as we have bi-directional feedback between residential and property
markets on one side, and banks’ balance sheets and lending decisions on the
other. Accounting for these deep real-financial linkages is of crucial importance
to the assessment of the financial stability implications of the different scenar-
ios.
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Figure 1: Actual and Fitted Values of Model Variables
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Notes: Figure shows the actual and predicted values from the corresponding model equations.
The equations are estimated over the period 1988 Q1 to 2015 Q4 with the exception of mortgage
arrears, for which data are only available since 2000 Q4. Note that the stock of mortgages, CRE,
OCorp, and consumer lending are notional stocks constructed from transactions series.
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Figure 2: Counterfactual Scenario with Countercyclical Credit Rule for LTV Ratio
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Notes: Figure shows the percent (%d) or percentage point (ppd) deviation of each variable from
its historical value under a countercyclical rule for the LTV ratio that targets credit growth. φc
determines the sensitivity of the LTV ratio to credit growth.
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Figure 3: Irish Real Time Credit Gap and the CCyB
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Notes: The solid line “Gap” is the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its HP-filtered
trend. CCyB lower and CCyB upper are the 2 percentage point lower bound and 10 percentage
point upper bound of the countercyclical capital buffer, respectively. Real-time estimates of GDP
are taken from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators database while the stock of private sector
credit is from the Central Bank of Ireland. The denominator in the credit-to-GDP ratio is the sum
of nominal GDP over the previous four quarters.
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Figure 4: Counterfactual Scenario with Countercyclical Capital Buffer
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Notes: Figure shows the percent (%d) or percentage point (ppd) deviation of each variable from
its baseline value for the period 2001 to 2015. The countercyclical capital buffer is set to its max-
imum value of 2.5 percentage points from 2001 Q1 to 2010 Q2, to 1.5 percentage points for 2010
Q3, and to zero for the period thereafter.
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Table 1: Demand in the Mortgage Market
NewMortgagest MorStockt
Constant 2.186 MorStockt−1 0.982
(4.2) (9.5)
NewMortgagest−1 0.715 NewMortgagest 1.0
(10.3) (n.a)
RMorRatet -0.029
(-2.9)
LTVt 0.751
(2.4)
LTIt 0.479
(2.8)
∆HPt−1 0.637
(2.8)
∆Incomet−1 1.079
(2.1)
Adj. R2 0.93 Adj R2 0.99
Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4 Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Table shows the estimation results of the equations for new mortgage lending, NewMort-
gages, and the (notional) mortgage stock, MorStock. RMorRate is the real mortgage rate. LTV is
the loan-to-value ratio and LTI is the loan-to-income ratio. HP and Income are real house prices
and personal disposable income, respectively. All variables in the equation for new mortgages,
except for interest rates, are in logs. t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 2: Supply in the Mortgage Market
MorRatet
Constant 15.951
(3.2)
MMRatet 0.771
(15.3)
DepRatet 0.182
(2.9)
HHEquityt -0.858
(-2.6)
URatet 0.611
(4.1)
LTDt -1.277
(-2.9)
CAPt 0.595
(2.7)
∆MorRatet
ECTt−1 -0.345
(-5.9)
∆MMRatet 0.538
(15.0)
∆Dept 0.105
(2.0)
∆CAPt−1 0.721
(2.12)
Dummies 1992Q4, 1993Q1
Adj R2 0.892
Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Table shows the estimation results for the mortgage interest rate, MorRate. MMRate is the
representative money market rate. DepRate is the deposit interest rate. URate is the unemploy-
ment rate. HHEquity is household equity. LTD is the loan-to-deposit ratio and CAP is the ratio of
bank capital to risk-weighted assets. All variables, except for interest rates, are in logs. t-statistics
are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Supply and Demand for Consumer Credit
Demand for Consumer Credit Supply of Consumer Credit
ConsCreditt ConsRatet
Constant -18.344 Constant 15.663
(-12.1) (5.1)
RConsRatet -0.006 MMRatet 0.329
(2.2) (6.64)
Incomet 0.524 DepRatet 0.659
(2.6) (8.5)
HHEquityt 0.381 URatet 0.429
(4.5) (2.0)
NFWt 0.079 ConsCreditt/Incomet 1.217
(1.9) (2.1)
CAPt 0.788
(2.9)
LTDt -3.131
(-4.9)
∆ConsCreditt ∆ConsRatet
ECTt−1 -0.131 ECTt−1 -0.269
(-3.2) (-4.1)
∆ConsCreditt−1 0.362 ∆MMRatet 0.297
(4.5) (6.2)
∆ConsCreditt−2 0.236 ∆DepRatet−1 0.199
(3.0) (2.4)
∆NHWt−2 0.258 ∆CAPt−1 0.768
(2.5) (2.7)
∆Incomet−4 0.166 ∆ConsRatet−3 0.141
(2.0) (2.6)
Dummies 2010Q4 Dummies 1992Q3,1993Q1
Adj. R2 0.712 Adj. R2 0.843
Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4 Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Tables shows the estimation results for the consumer credit, ConsCredit, and consumer
lending rate, ConsRate, equations. RConsRate is the real consumer lending rate. NHW is net
housing wealth and NFW is net financial wealth. All variables, except for interest rates, are in
logs. t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 4: Demand for Non-Financial Corporate Credit
CREt OCorpt
Constant 25.981 Constant -5.934
(-2.9) (-8.6)
RCorpRatet -0.018 RCorpRatet -0.006
(-2.8) (-2.0)
RGDPt 1.723 RGDPt 1.263
(6.3) (15.3)
ComPropt 0.831 ComPropt 0.352
(2.0) (9.4)
HWt 1.113 Profitst -0.665
(2.1) (-9.3)
∆CREt ∆OCorpt
ECTt−1 -0.035 ECTt−1 -0.061
(-4.4) (-2.9)
∆RCorpRatet−2 -0.003 ∆Profitst−2 -0.059
(-3.4) (-2.1)
∆CREt−2 0.272 ∆OCorpt−2 0.182
(3.1) (2.2)
∆CREt−3 0.174 ∆RGDPt−2 0.192
(2.3) (2.0)
∆ComPropt−3 0.096
(2.2)
Dummies 1990Q1, 2009Q1 Dummies 2009Q1
Adj. R2 0.724 Adj R2 0.643
Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4 Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Table presents the estimation results of the equations for lending to non-financial cor-
porations, decomposed into commercial real estate lending, CRE, and other corporate lending,
OCorp. RCorpRate is the real interest rate on lending to non-financial corporations. RGDP is real
gross domestic product. ComProp is the real value of commercial property and HW is the real
value of the housing stock. Profits relate to the profits of non-financial corporations. All variables
are in logs except for interest rates. t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Supply of Non-Financial Corporate Credit
CorpRatet
Constant 2.721
(4.2)
MMRatet 0.814
(18.6)
DepRatet 0.159
(2.56)
Insolvt 0.859
(6.3)
CorpCreditt/GDPt 0.918
(2.8)
CAPt 0.514
(2.3)
LTDt -2.125
(-3.3)
∆CorpRatet
ECTt−1 -0.203
(-2.1)
∆MMatet 0.981
(9.4)
∆CAPt−3 0.386
(2.0)
∆CorpRatet−3 0.026
(3.1)
Dummies 1992Q4,1993Q1, 2009Q1
Adj R2 0.971
Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Table shows the estimation results of the equation for the interest rate on corporate lend-
ing, CorpRate. MMRate is the representative money market interest rate. DepRate is the deposit
interest rate. Insolv is the corporate insolvency rate. CorpCredit is total non-financial corpo-
rate credit. CAP is the capital ratio and LTD is the loan-to-deposit ratio. All variables, except for
interest rates, are in logs. t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 6: Demand for Housing and Commerical Property
Housing Commercial Property
HPt ComValt
Constant 24.105 Constant 17.096
(14.9) (16.5)
Userht -0.008 User
c
t -0.007
(-7.7) (-6.3)
Incomet 0.701 RGDPt 1.055
(4.9) (13.4)
MorStockt/Incomet 0.518 CorpCreditt/GDPt 0.789
(8.8) (8.8)
HStockt/Pop2539t -1.282 KStockt/Empt -1.853
(-5.9) (-12.0)
∆HPt ∆ComValt
ECTt−1 -0.073 ECTt−1 -0.043
(-4.0) (-2.7)
∆Incomet 0.211 ∆Insolvt−1 -0.035
(4.4) (-2.3)
∆URatet−1 -0.074 ∆Insolvt−3 -0.032
(-2.4) (-2.2)
∆(MorStockt−1/Incomet−1) 0.157 ∆(CorpCreditt−1/GDPt−1) 0.229
(4.1) (2.6)
∆HPt−1 0.338 ∆HPt−2 0.362
(3.6) (2.9)
∆HPt−2 0.188 ∆HPt−3 0.265
(2.7) (2.1)
Dummies 2014Q2 Dummies 2008Q4, 2014Q3
Adj. R2 0.679 Adj. R2 0.613
Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4 Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Table shows the estimation results of the equations for real house prices, HP, and real
commercial capital values, ComVal. Userh is the user cost of housing. HStock is the stock of
housing. Pop2539 is the number of 25 to 39 year olds in the population. Userc is the user cost
of commercial property investment. CorpCredit is total corporate lending. KStock is the private
sector capital stock. Emp is total private sector employment. All variables, except for interest
rates, are in logs. t-statistics are in parentheses.
90
Table 7: Housing Supply: New Housing Completions
HComplt
Constant 0.189
(0.5)
HComplt−1 0.788
(23.7)
Tobint 0.348
(2.1)
∆RCorpRatet -0.023
(-5.9)
∆CREt−1 0.501
(3.2)
GAPt 0.459
(2.4)
∆ Insolvt -0.128
(-1.8)
∆(Pop2539t/Popt) 1.496
(2.9)
Adj. R2 0.972
Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Table shows the determinants of new housing completions, HCompl. Tobin is the ratio of
house prices to building costs. RCorpRate is the real interest rate on lending to non-financial cor-
porations. GAP is the output gap computed as the deviation of real GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott
filtered trend. Pop is the total population. All variables are in logs except for the corporate lend-
ing rate. t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 8: Mortgage Arrears and Corporate Insolvencies
Arrearst Insolvt
Constant 4.727 Constant -0.076
(4.0) (-0.1)
HHEquityt -2.448 ComPropt -0.332
(-7.1) (-2.4)
MorRatet 1.281 RCorpRatet 0.010
(3.7) (1.8)
URatet 0.538 URatet 0.406
(2.1) (4.3)
MorStockt/Incomet 5.557 OCorpt/GDPt 0.663
(17.1) (2.3)
∆Arrearst ∆Insolvt
ECTt−1 -0.083 ECTt−1 -0.269
(1.9) (-3.4)
∆URatet 0.925 ∆URatet 0.695
(2.8) (2.4)
∆MorRatet−1 0.547 ∆Insolvt−1 -0.267
(1.8) (-2.6)
∆HHEquityt−2 -1.645 ∆Insolvt−2 -0.193
(2.0) (-2.2)
∆ComPropt−2 -0.971
(-2.4)
Dummies 2005Q1
Adj. R2 0.504 Adj. R2 0.396
Sample 2000Q4-2015Q4 Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Table presents the estimation results for the households mortgage arrears, Arrears, and
corporate insolvency, Insolv, equations. All variables are in logs except for the real corporate
lending interest rate. t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 9: Determinants of Banks’ Capital Ratio
CAPt
Constant 0.147
(0.166)
Assetst/GDPt -1.402
(-4.5)
URatet 0.453
(4.6)
Spreadt 0.025
(2.3)
CREt/Loanst 0.686
(2.8)
Depositst/Liabilitiest -0.769
(-2.2)
∆CAPt
ECTt−1 -0.074
(-2.3)
∆Assetst−1/GDPt−1 -0.479
(-3.7)
∆Insolvt−2 0.028
(2.4)
∆HPt−3 -0.439
(-2.4)
Dummies 2010Q4, 2011Q3
Adj. R2 0.597
Sample 1988Q1-2015Q4
Notes: Table shows the determinants of the balance sheet capital ratio, CAP, given by the ratio
of bank capital to risk-weighted assets. Assets and Liabilities are the total assets and liabilities of
the banking sector, respectively. Spread is the difference between a weighted-average of lending
rates and the money market rate. All variables are in logs except for the yield curve spread.
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Table 10: Change in Level and Variability under LTV Rules
Credit Rule House Price Rule GDP Rule
φc = 1 φc = 4 φc = 7 φh = 1 φh = 4 φh = 7 φy = 1 φy = 4 φy = 7
New Mor. -25.3 -46.7 -59.9 -18.8 -31.6 -43.9 -18.9 -30.3 -41.5
(-17.7) (-35.9) (-46.4) (-14.3) (-28.9) (-41.2) (-12.2) (-22.5) (-33.4)
Mor. Stock -16.7 -31.6 -40.5 -12.3 -21.8 -29.2 -12.1 -22.2 -30.8
(-9.3) (-14.9) (-19.2) (-6.7) (-6.6) (-6.6) (-7.2) (-7.9) (-8.2)
H. Prices -3.2 -5.8 -7.5 -2.3 -3.4 -4.4 -2.4 -3.7 -4.9
(-19.1) (-32.7) (-38.4) (-14.5) (-24.7) (-31.2) (-13.6) (-23.9) (-31.7)
H. Compl. -8.2 -17.1 -21.9 -6.0 -12.5 -17.2 -5.7 -12.5 -18.2
(-2.3) (-6.3) (-10.2) (-1.7) (-6.2) (-9.1) (-1.3) (-5.8) (-9.6)
H. Stock -1.7 -3.6 -4.7 -1.2 -2.7 -3.8 -1.1 -2.7 -3.9
(-8.0) (-15.9) (-20.3) (-5.9) (-11.6) (-15.8) (-5.7) (-11.7) (-16.7)
Arrears -66.6 -89.3 -95.4 -54.4 -76.6 -87.3 -53.8 -77.1 -88.8
(-5.5) (-10.2) (-15.2) (-3.6) (-3.1) (-2.5) (-4.0) (-4.4) (-4.4)
HH Equity 9.8 24.6 36.3 6.8 15.9 24.3 6.5 15.8 25.5
(-16.6) (-31.0) (-40.2) (-12.1) (-19.3) (-25.2) (-12.1) (-20.1) (-27.1)
Notes: Table shows the percentage change in the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses)
of variables under each countercyclical LTV rule, where φc, φh and φy indicate the sensitivity of
the corresponding rule to credit growth, house price appreciation, and gdp growth, respectively.
